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The Legal Design for Parenting 
Concussion Risk 
Katharine Silbaugh* 
This Article addresses a question as yet unexplored in the emerging 
concussion risk literature: how does the statutorily assigned parental role 
in concussion risk management conceptualize the legal significance of the 
parent, and does it align with other areas of law that authorize and limit 
parental risk decision-making? Parents are the centerpiece of the “Lystedt” 
youth concussion legislation in all fifty states, and yet the extensive legal 
literature about that legislation contains no discussion of parents as legal 
actors and makes no effort to situate their statutory role into the larger legal 
framework of parental authority. This Article considers the Lystedt 
framework from the perspective of other law engaging parental authority 
and parental decision-making, placing Lystedt’s parental role in that larger 
family law framework. That lens reveals that the Lystedt legislation may be 
using the cultural capital of parental authority to shield youth athletic 
leagues from having to fully grapple with concussion risk. Under the Lystedt 
framework, parents are unwittingly functioning as an impediment to safety 
improvements, shielding athletic associations from conventional pressures 
to improve. The operation of Lystedt is in this way a departure from related 
areas of law that set boundaries on parental authority to accept risk of 
injury on behalf of a child, including limitations on the enforcement of 
parental waivers of liability. Finally, Lystedt unrealistically elevates 
parental responsibility without adequately providing parents the capacity 
and opportunity to be effective protectors of their children’s welfare. I argue 
that in a time of intense cultural ambivalence about concussion risk in 
athletics, the rich concept of parental authority is expropriated in the 
Lystedt concussion statutes to avoid threats to the structure of youth sports 
that would otherwise be vulnerable to pressures to change in order to reduce 
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concussion risk. The NFL lobbied states to adopt this legislation, under 
which parents function to preserve the status quo. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A concussion is a traumatic brain injury caused by a blow, bump, or 
jolt to the head or body.1 Over the past decade, all fifty states have 
enacted “Lystedt” legislation to address an expanded understanding of 
concussion frequency and of the long-term negative outcomes 
associated with concussions (more accurately termed traumatic brain 
injuries).2 Lystedt laws focus on educating athletes, coaches, and 
parents about the signs that an athlete may have suffered a concussion 
and the need to keep a concussed athlete out of play until she is cleared 
by a medical professional. A legal literature has emerged evaluating the 
limitations and efficacy of these laws in reducing the risk to athletes, as 
well as the array of litigation in professional and collegiate sports over 
harms already incurred.3  
 
 1 TBI: Get the Facts, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
traumaticbraininjury/get_the_facts.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 
2
 See Patricia Guthrie, Ex Youth Football Player: You Could End Up Like Me, WEBMD 
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.webmd.com/brain/news/20151021/concussion-zack-
lystedt#1 (explaining that Washington State resident Zachary Lystedt suffered two 
football concussions at age 13 that even ten years later leave him walking with a cane 
and suffering with debilitating short-term memory loss and speech impediment). 
 3 See, e.g., Douglas E. Abrams, Concussion Safety in Children’s Sports: A Central Role 
for the “Power of the Permit,” 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2015); Taylor Adams, Comment, 
The Repercussions of Concussions in Youth Football Leagues: An Analysis of Texas’s 
Concussion Law and Why Reform Is Necessary, 18 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. 
JUST. 285, 344 (2016); Erin P. Andrews, Note, Avoiding the Technical Knockout: Tackling 
the Inadequacies of Youth Concussion Legislation, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 421-22 
(2013/2014); Roy G. Beran, Concussion - A Question of Negligence, 36 MED. & L. 121, 
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From many quarters in our political economy, we have experienced 
a reallocation of risk from institutions to individuals and families, 
ranging from the defined contribution insurance plan to the shift in 
social welfare benefits under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
 
128 (2017); Jayce Born, Note, National Protection of Student-Athlete Mental Health: The 
Case for Federal Regulation over the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 92 IND. L.J. 
1221, 1245 (2017); Kevin Brandwein, Goals and Obstacles in Legislating Concussion 
Management in Youth Sports, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 28, 53 (2013); Andrew W. 
Breck, Note, Keeping Your Head on Straight: Protecting Indiana Youth Athletes from 
Traumatic Brain Injuries Through “Return-to-Play” Legislation, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 215 
(2012); Kirstie Brenson, Comment, Head to Head: The NFL Concussion Scandal and an 
Argument for OSHA Regulation, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 595, 626 (2017); Tracey B. Carter, 
It Is a Mindboggling Dilemma: To Play or Not to Play Youth Sports Due to Concussion Risks, 
67 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 65 (2018); P. Chrisman et al., Implementation of Concussion 
Legislation and Extent of Concussion Education for Athletes, Parents, and Coaches in 
Washington State, 42 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1190, 1195 (2014); Sam C. Ehrlich, Gratuitous 
Promises: Overseeing Athletic Organizations and the Duty to Care, 25 JEFFREY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 1, 48-49 (2018); Hosea H. Harvey, Refereeing the Public Health, 14 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 66, 105 (2014); Samuel D. Hodge Jr. & Jack E. Hubbard, 
Depression: The Often Overlooked Sequela of Head Trauma, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 31, 67-
68 (2017); Theresa S. Kim, Tackling Head Injuries in Youth and Interscholastic Football 
with NFL Contract Reform, 24 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 93 (2017); Sungwon Kim et al., 
Legislative Efforts to Reduce Concussions in Youth Sports: An Analysis of State Concussion 
Statutes, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORTS 162 (2017); Chris Lau, Note, Leaders and Laggards: 
Tackling State Legislative Responses to the Youth Sports Concussion Epidemic, 85 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2879, 2912 (2017); Bryant Lee, Note, Knocked Unconscionable: College Football 
Scholarships and Traumatic Brain Injury, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 643-44 (2017); 
Kerri M. Lowrey et al., Do Ethics Demand Evaluation of Public Health Laws? Shifting 
Scientific Sands and the Case of Youth Sports-Related Traumatic Brain Injury Laws, 19 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 99 (2016); Kerry M. Lowrey & Stephanie R. Morain, State 
Experiences Implementing Youth Sports Concussion Laws: Challenges, Successes, and 
Lessons for Evaluating Impact, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 290, 290-96 (2014); Michael 
Meyers, Note, Utilizing Alternative Dispute Resolution to Foster Comprehensive Traumatic 
Brain Injury Research, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 905, 929 (2017); David E. 
Missirian, Student Athlete Concussions: The Often Overlooked Legal and Ethical Minefield, 
6 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 47 (2017); Stephanie A. Murray, Note, The Misnomer 
of the NFL’s “Concussion Crisis”: Don’t Count on the NFL to Solve Football’s Biggest 
Problem - and OSHA Regulation May Not Save the Game Either, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 181, 
214-15 (2017); Francis X. Shen, Are Youth Sports Concussion Statutes Working?, 56 DUQ. 
L. REV. 8, 9 (2018); Lance K. Spaude, Comment, Time to Act: Correcting the Inadequacy 
of Youth Concussion Legislation Through a Federal Act, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 1094 (2017); 
Marie-France Wilson, Youth Athletes at Risk: Preventing and Managing Consequences of 
Sports Concussions in Young Athletes and the Related Legal Issues, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
241, 288 (2010); see also Adam M. Finkel et al., The NFL as a Workplace: The Prospect 
of Applying Occupational Health and Safety Law to Protect NFL Workers, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 
291, 367-68 (2018). 
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to the risks associated with educational debt.4 One legal scholar 
observes:  
Western society has not only embraced risk as a useful 
conceptual framework, but has also embraced risk as a matter 
of social policy. Governments, large employers, and other big 
institutions that used to spread risks are encouraging and 
sometimes requiring individuals to embrace the actual risks that 
they encounter in their lives. Across Western society, 
governments and other big institutions are to a degree cutting 
people loose from social structures that spread risk, exposing 
individuals to more risk, making them more individually 
responsible — all in the name of creating a more dynamic, 
entrepreneurial, and creative society.5 
The structure of concussion legislation reflects this trend. This Article 
is the first to offer scrutiny of the implicit theory by which it operates: 
that parents can become informed about the shifting scientific 
landscape around concussion and use that information to make 
effective and legitimate risk decisions on behalf of their children. This 
Article addresses a question unexplored in the concussion law 
literature: how does the parental role assigned under the Lystedt 
framework conceptualize the legal significance of the parent, and does 
that concept align with other areas of law that authorize and limit 
parental risk decision-making? I conclude that the Lystedt framework 
shifts more authority to parents to assume risk on behalf of a child than 
is typical under existing legal justifications, and further, that parents’ 
temperament and skills in the youth sports context are particularly ill-
suited to their elevated authority. Judging from its structure and 
operation, Lystedt legislation does not appear to elevate parental 
authority out of respect for parents’ efficacy, but instead because parents 
are the essential tool in the transfer of risk away from organizations and 
to children. 
In engineering for safety, the hierarchy is design, guard, and then 
warn.6 We try first to develop an alternative design that reduces risk. 
 
 4 Tom Baker, Embracing Risk, Sharing Responsibility, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 562 
(2008); Jonathan Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
1561, 1563 (2015). 
 5 Baker, supra note 4, at 562.  
 
6
 Kenneth R. Laughery & Michael S. Wogalter, The Safety Hierarchy and Its Role in 
Safety Decisions, in ADVANCES IN HUMAN FACTORS, ERGONOMICS, AND SAFETY IN 
MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES 1010, 1010 (Karwowski & Salvendy eds., 2010) 
(“The safety hierarchy, or hazard control hierarchy, is a priority scheme for dealing with 
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When that is not feasible, we guard against the risk through physical 
barriers. When that is not feasible, we warn users and rely on human 
behavior modification or personal risk preference. Feasibility drives the 
movement down the hierarchy.7 
When regulating, we deem some risks so serious that they cannot be 
left to warnings alone. Individuals may not prescribe themselves 
oxycodone. In many states, individuals must protect their heads with a 
helmet when riding a motorcycle, regardless of personal risk 
preference.8 Although no state requires adults to wear a helmet when 
riding a bicycle, in many states, a child must wear a helmet when riding 
a bicycle, regardless of her parent’s risk preferences.9 Employers may 
not employ ten-year-olds, even with parental consent.10  
In regulation, as distinct from engineering and design, whether we 
choose to prohibit or warn doesn’t always appear to be based on the 
risk-reward calculation, or feasibility. Instead, warning in place of re-
design can sometimes result from other forces. For example, economic 
power and the distribution of benefits from risk allocation can influence 
whether we redesign or simply warn. Consider tobacco: as a result of an 
industry’s economic strength and path dependence, we regulate by 
warning even though design thinking alone would likely point us in a 
different direction. 
Economic power isn’t the only thing that shapes or diverts regulation. 
Cultural ambivalence can as well. At times of awkward cultural 
contradiction, where the intangible values in the risk balance are 
unstable, we sometimes begin regulating with warnings and 
information rather than with redesign, leaving risk choice to the warned 
and informed individual.11 We might endeavor to improve the decision-
making of the individual by providing both information and awareness 
 
product hazards. It is often referred to as the design, guard and warn sequence.”); see 
also Marc Green, Safety Hierarchy: Design vs. Warnings, VISUAL EXPERT, 
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/safetyhierarchy.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).  
 7 See sources cited supra note 6. 
 8 Motorcycle Helmet Use Laws, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA 
INST., https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/laws/helmetuse/mapmotorcyclehelmets (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
 9 Pedestrians and Bicyclists, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA 
INST., https://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/pedestrians-and-bicyclists/topicoverview (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2019); State-by-State Helmet Laws Guide to Motorcycle Helmet Laws, 
CONSUMER REPS., https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2011/06/state-by-state-
guide-to-motorcycle-helmet-laws/index.htm (last updated July 4, 2014). 
 
10
 See Youth & Labor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/ 
youthlabor (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).  
 11 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4-7 (2008) (calling this “libertarian paternalism”). 
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of decision moments that might otherwise be governed by inertia,12 but 
the awkward cultural contradiction will be resolved by individuals until 
greater stability in the relevant social values emerges. 
With respect to concussion risk in youth sports, our times have 
yielded just that strategy: provide information but do not prohibit risks. 
We live in an era of cultural disagreement about concussion risk in 
youth sports — about weighing the relative health, enjoyment, and 
character values of risky sports to a child against the risk of serious, 
sometimes lifelong, and sometimes fatal brain injury.13 While the 
science is still evolving, the negative side of this balance is coming into 
sharper focus with improved understanding of the gravity of traumatic 
brain injury (concussion). Assigning weight to the positive side is 
relatively more open to debate. We also see significant economic 
interests in professional sports that may influence regulators toward the 
status quo. 
How well does well-informed consent resolve the concussion risk 
exposure when the players are minors? Surely the potential devastation 
of a brain injury must warrant as much focused informed, meaningful 
consent for youth players as it does for adults, especially since the risk 
of permanent harm is greater when concussion occurs in younger 
athletes.14 In other contexts of this type of cultural ambivalence, the way 
we treat minors is instructive. We sometimes prohibit risky behaviors 
for youth — drinking, smoking, riding a bicycle without a helmet, 
participating in the workforce, sexual conduct — even when we allow 
adults to exercise choice about those risks for themselves. We deem 
minors too immature to reason properly about health and safety risks 
in those contexts, and parental judgment inadequate to cover for either 
childhood immaturity or third party pressures when the risks at stake 
are to a child’s long-term health and safety. When the value of a risk is 
in dispute, it is not uncommon to allow adults to choose a risk for 
themselves, while prohibiting parents from choosing the risk for their 
children. 
But at this time, we are still framing youth sports concussion risk as 
a freedom or a permissible choice. One recent example of this framing 
within the legal academy captures perfectly the rhetorical power of 
 
 12 Id.; see also Baker, supra note 4. 
 13 See, e.g., Albert Samaha, Opinion, The Kids Who Still Need Football, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/opinion/sunday/football-kids-
brain-damage.html. 
 14 See Ramadevi Pullela et al., Traumatic Injury to the Immature Brain Results in 
Progressive Neuronal Loss, Hyperactivity and Delayed Cognitive Impairments, 28 DEV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 396, 396-97 (2006). 
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information and choice as a mechanism for managing cultural 
contradiction around concussion: 
Such contrasting views make it difficult for policymakers to 
know what, exactly, to do. The policy challenge going forward 
is thus to facilitate accurate communication of risks and benefits 
to allow for informed athlete and parent decision-making.15 
The author of this statement aims to evaluate the efficacy of the Lystedt 
laws at conveying information. But in order to evaluate that policy 
framework, we need to consider not only the efficacy of parental 
education, but the rationale for parental judgment in this context. 
Moreover, we need to compare risk communication to more direct 
incentive for design improvements, before we can decide that parental 
consent and the Lystedt structure is an adequate method of 
safeguarding children’s brains. When we view Lystedt as an effort to 
reduce the worst risks caused by concussions, which is exposure to a 
subsequent concussion before a first concussion is healed, the rationale 
for its structure may be defensible. But when we view Lystedt in 
comparison to the background law limiting parental ability to choose 
health and safety risks for a child, Lystedt is much harder to defend. 
Indeed, Lystedt’s conception of parental authority departs from existing 
law in related areas, and in so doing, reduces incentives toward safer 
design. 
This Article expands the Lystedt literature to situate Lystedt in the 
existing law governing parental waiver of liability in particular. A 
substantial majority of states refuse to enforce pre-injury waivers of 
liability signed by parents on behalf of their children. The rationale 
underlying the law of parental waivers constructs parental judgment as 
too flawed to address both a minor’s interests in appropriately managed 
risk, and third parties’ efforts to commandeer parental authority for the 
purpose of shifting risk from institutions to children. Yet the Lystedt 
infrastructure is substantially dependent on that same nexus of 
judgment and interests in a context that is particularly mismatched to 
parental skill.  
For a number of reasons, parents make bad decision-makers about 
children’s concussion risk. Parents struggle with the technical difficulty 
of comprehending concussion prevalence, symptoms, and 
consequences. The Lystedt’s focus on post-concussion instructions 
obscures the underlying decision to confront a primary risk of incurring 
the first concussion. The information mandates do not include 
 
 15 Shen, supra note 3. 
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conveying the likelihood of a first concussion or the fact that many 
Lystedt statutes provide coaches and schools with immunity from 
ordinary negligence liability.16 The focus on the need to remove an 
athlete from play immediately if signs of concussion appear are 
particularly ineffective when directed toward parents, as distinct from 
coaches, because parents are not necessarily present when the injury 
occurs. Finally, parents are not at their best in the youth sports context. 
Both research and common experience indicate that parents have a 
propensity toward strong personal emotions in the youth sports context 
that impair their skill at making a decision on behalf of another person.17 
Research demonstrates that parents are susceptible to the unique 
cultural force of sport in society; they are too much a part of it to serve 
as a check on it.18 Where that kind of emotion or role confusion is seen 
in other contexts, the legal system ordinarily responds by constraining 
parental authority. The gravity of consenting to the risk of a nebulous 
lifelong injury for another person deserves our attention. The concept of 
the parent, I argue, is deployed to protect the status quo, and to 
postpone more systematic and expert design thinking that could reduce 
overall risk. 
Part I explores the cultural contradictions surrounding football, to 
clarify the characteristics of our risk ambivalence. Part II describes the 
problem of traumatic brain injury (concussion), sorting through 
estimates of its prevalence in youth athletes and then describing its 
consequences. Part III describes the Lystedt legislation, and then recasts 
it as an imitation of an informed consent framework. Part IV explores 
the law of parental authority and its rationales, with a particular focus 
on parental waivers of liability for negligence, and explores the 
interaction between waiver law and the Lystedt statutes. Part V 
considers the special attributes of the youth sports parent, and then 
critiques the Lystedt’s information framework in light of the problem of 
youth sports parents. It concludes that unless risky contact sports are 
 
 16 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 118.293 (2013) (“Any athletic coach, official involved in 
an athletic activity, or volunteer who fails to remove a person from a youth athletic 
activity . . . is immune from civil liability for any injury resulting from that omission 
unless it constitutes gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct.”).  
 17 See discussion infra Part V. 
 18 See discussion infra Part V; see, e.g., Michael S. Rosenwald, Are Parents Ruining 
Youth Sports? Fewer Kids Play Amid Pressure, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/are-parents-ruining-youth-sports-fewer-kids-
play-amid-pressure/2015/10/04/eb1460dc-686e-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html? 
utm_term=.d21eb93477e6.  
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prohibited entirely for minors,19 the choice architecture needs 
substantial improvement to adequately inform parents and youth 
athletes of the consequences of exposure to heightened concussion risk. 
In addition, the Article suggests that the current legislative structure 
actually impedes overall risk reduction by reducing redesign pressure 
from insurers on sports and disarming parents from effective 
participation in that redesign process. 
I. CULTURAL CONUNDRUM: FOOTBALL, DESTRUCTION, 
ENTERTAINMENT 
On September 28, 2018, 16-year-old Dylan Thomas of Zebulon, 
Georgia, fell in the third quarter of a high school football game. Though 
he needed help standing up, he was able to respond to questions, but 
later lost consciousness.20 He died two days later from traumatic brain 
injury, or what we commonly call concussion.21 In October of 2017, 16-
year-old Carlos Sanchez of Phoenix, Arizona died after suffering a 
concussion trying to complete a block in a football game.22 A few years 
earlier, 16-year-old Chad Stover lost his life to concussion playing in a 
high school football game on Halloween night in Tipton, Missouri.23 On 
September 11, 2015, 16-year-old Ben Hamm went for a tackle on a 
kickoff return, taking a hit that was described as not unusual and not 
bigger than others.24 He died several days later. In October of 2015, 17-
 
 19 Bennett Omalu, Don’t Let Kids Play Football, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/opinion/dont-let-kids-play-football.html. (arguing 
that child welfare requires the prohibition of contact football for minors); see also Chris 
Hemond, Hockey Concussion: Is it Child Abuse? 184 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 861 (2012) (raising 
the same argument for hockey). 
 
20
 Justin Baxley, ‘An anomaly.’ Reports Detail Pike County Football Player Dylan 
Thomas’ Cause of Death, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 9, 2018, 9:56 PM), https://www.macon.com/ 
news/local/community/houston-peach/article219742730.html; Adrianne Haney & 
Michael King, High School Football Player in Georgia Dies Sunday From Injuries Sustained 
in Friday Game, USA TODAY (Oct. 1, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/sports/highschool/2018/10/01/georgia-high-school-football-player-dylan-thomas-
dies/1485428002/.  
 
21
 Baxley, supra note 20. 
 22 Joshua R. Miller, Arizona High School Football Player Died Blocking on Play, N.Y. 
POST (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://nypost.com/2017/10/31/arizona-high-school-
football-player-died-blocking-on-play/. 
 
23
 Sean Gregory, Football’s Ultimate Cost: The Chad Stover Story, TIME (Sept. 18, 
2014), http://time.com/3394893/football-brain-injury-chad-stover/. 
 24 Paighten Harkins, Wesleyan Christian School High School Football Player Dies After 
Injury, TULSA WORLD (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.tulsaworld.com/communities/ 
bartlesville/wesleyan-christian-school-high-school-football-player-dies-after-injury/article_ 
604c55cf-26f0-5fba-8c18-f4f3f1e93521.html; Kalyn Kahler & Dan Greene, The Game’s 
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year-old Kenney Bui of Seattle died of a traumatic brain injury after 
stepping off of the football field seeming dazed.25 In Chicago, 17-year-
old Andre Smith died from a hit to the head in a high school game later 
that same month.26 In November of 2015, 17-year-old Luke Schemm 
died of a traumatic brain injury from a shoulder-to-shoulder hit taken 
as he was scoring a conversion.27 In that particularly bad year of 2015 
alone, thirteen high school students died playing football, at least six 
due to traumatic brain injury (concussion).28 This is not a 
comprehensive list of recent high school football deaths. According to 
the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”), in 2017, 2.5 million high 
school students experienced concussions, a number significantly higher 
than previous reports that had been based on emergency room visits or 
based on only students who had lost consciousness.29 The CDC reports 
that an average of 2.4 high school students die each season from 
football-induced traumatic brain injury.30 Death is a rare concussion 
outcome, but the 2.5 million high school students who suffer a 
concussion each year experience a range of other cognitive, physical, 
and emotional deficits, and for many these will be long-term and lead 
to depression, cognitive impairment, and premature Alzheimer’s 
disease, Parkinson’s disease, and multiple sclerosis.31 
 
Tragic Toll, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.si.com/mmqb/2015/11/24/ 
high-school-football-deaths-2015. 
 25 Les Carpenter, Kenney Bui: The Life and Death of a High School Football Player, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/oct/14/ 
kenney-bui-high-school-football (explaining that in Bui’s case, his parents attempted to 
prevent him from playing football, particularly as he was cleared 13 days after a first 
concussion in the same season that he died).  
 26 Dana Ford & Ray Sanchez, High School Football Player Andre Smith Dies in Illinois, 
CNN (Oct. 26, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/25/us/illinois-high-
school-football-player-death.  
 27 Kahler & Greene, supra note 24; see also Cam Smith, Parents of Kansas Teen Luke 
Schemm Believe Death Was a ‘Fluke Accident’, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://usatodayhss.com/2015/parents-of-late-kansas-teen-luke-schemm-believe-death-
was-a-fluke-accident. 
 
28
 See Diane Herbst, Experts Alarmed Over 13 High School Football Deaths This 
Season, PEOPLE (Dec. 3, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://people.com/sports/experts-alarmed-
over-13-high-school-football-deaths-this-season/ (explaining that heat stroke, spinal 
injury, and brain injury were the primary causes of death). 
 
29
 Lara DePadilla et al., Self-Reported Concussions from Playing a Sport or Being 
Physically Active Among High School Students - United States, 2017, 67 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 682 (2018). 
 30 Kristen L. Kucera et al., Traumatic Brain and Spinal Cord Fatalities Among High 
School and College Football Players - United States, 2005–2014, 65 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1465 (2017).  
 31 See infra Part II.B. 
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Concussion in professional sports has attracted substantial attention 
in the past decade. At the professional level, football, ice hockey, and 
soccer have been the targets of both legal actions and saturated media 
coverage of head injury and team and league responses to it. In 2017, 
the National Football League (“NFL”) reported 281 concussions, an all-
time high.32 The interest in concussion in professional football is 
particularly intense. In September 2014, the NFL acknowledged, in 
documents intended to help them to calculate liability payments, that 
approximately one-third of retired football players will develop 
dementia, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis 
(“ALS”), or similarly debilitating cognitive disorders, at premature 
ages.33 Defendants in lawsuits aren’t known to overestimate their 
exposure during settlement negotiations, so if there’s any controversy 
in this estimate, it would be whether it is high enough, not too high. A 
study in 2017 reported head pain or migraine symptoms consistent with 
post-concussion sequelae in fully 92% of retired football players.34 This 
stark prognosis for NFL players increases the heat of the question, “how 
much is too much?”, or as a cover of Time Magazine put it, “Is Football 
Worth It?”.35 
Yet Americans love football. For now, the fundamental safety 
threshold for professional football is balanced on the other side by the 
more than 18 million viewers who tune in to watch Sunday night 
football each weekend.36 Football is the most popular sport to watch in 
the United States, and despite a modest drop in the past year, it remains 
near the height of its popularity.37 The conversation around concussion 
in football incorporates this glaring contradiction: the sport is at once 
beloved by the public and devastating to the players and to their 
 
 
32
 Kevin Seifert, NFL Concussions Continue to Rise, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/22226487/nfl-concussions-rise-highest-level-league-
began-sharing-data. 
 
33
 Ken Belson, Brain Trauma to Affect One in Three Players, N.F.L. Agrees, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/sports/football/actuarial-reports-
in-nfl-concussion-deal-are-released.html. 
 34 Randolph W. Evans, The Prevalence of Migraine and Other Neurological Conditions 
Among Retired National Football League Players: A Pilot Study, PRACTICAL NEUROLOGY, 
Nov./Dec. 2017, at 23. 
 35 Sean Gregory, The Tragic Risks of American Football, TIME (Sept. 18, 2014), 
https://time.com/magazine/us/3397061/september-29th-2014-vol-184-no-12-u-s/. 
 
36
 Rani Molla, ‘Sunday Night Football’ was the Highest-Rated TV Show This Year, but 
its Audience Is Smaller Than Last Year, RECODE (Dec. 18, 2017, 1:11 PM): 
https://www.recode.net/2017/12/18/16791198/sunday-night-football-tv-nielsen-2017-
most-watched. 
 37 Id. 
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families. Without the intense love of football from the fans, it is difficult 
to imagine the tolerance of this amount of acceptable destruction to the 
brains of the players. As a thought experiment, imagine a new game 
were invented, in which players ran through obstacle courses, and one-
third would break their backs or hit their heads in a way that caused 
permanent brain damage. It likely would fail from the start, no matter 
how entertaining. Like tobacco, football is a special case, and the love 
of football is the regulatory complication. Understanding the cultural 
force of adult football is essential to understanding the state of traumatic 
brain injury prevention protocols in both youth football and in the array 
of other youth sports struggling with the problem in the shadow of 
football. The way we resolve the adult risk landscape may not entirely 
control the youth risk landscape, but I would argue that it’s impossible 
to ignore the significant influence of the adult resolution on the youth 
landscape. 
Football has always been dangerous. Forty-five football players died 
between 1900 and 1905, when Teddy Roosevelt convened Ivy League 
leaders at the White House to save football by “reducing the element of 
brutality in play,” leading to a series of reforms such as forward passing 
of the ball, which spread players out and reduced contact.38 Even with 
these reforms, in the year 1931, “football killed 40 boys and young 
men.”39 Danger has been as much a feature as a bug in the history of the 
football. But the contours of that danger are gaining greater clarity from 
a mix of substantially improved medical research, lawsuits, and media 
coverage. Knowing something is generally dangerous is different from 
understanding exactly which dangers are present, the specific and long-
term consequences of those dangers, and participants’ likelihood of 
suffering those consequences.  
Meaningful consent requires information; this is the premise of fairly 
allocating risk calculations to individual participants. While many 
research questions remain, there is substantially more information 
about these dangers than there was a decade ago. Some in the football 
industry, like legendary broadcaster Bob Costas, have repeatedly 
questioned whether football can survive our improved medical 
understanding, and are working to improve sports broadcast coverage 
to reduce the amount of placating euphemism and to replace it with 
 
 
38
 Katie Zezima, How Teddy Roosevelt Helped Save Football, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014, 
5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/teddy-roosevelt-
helped-save-football-with-a-white-house-meeting-in-1905/. 
 
39
 Medicine: Varsatility, TIME (Dec. 14, 1931), http://content.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,930056,00.html.  
  
210 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:197 
more accurate and sober language and information.40 Costas has 
basically left football, concluding that the game “destroys people’s 
brains.”41 
In the United States today, 1.1 million high school students play 
football at school.42 Another 3 million youth play non-school, organized 
contact football using full protective gear, such as middle and 
elementary school Pop Warner play.43 By contrast, only 100,000 play in 
collegiate or professional or semi-professional post-high school 
settings.44 Framing the discussion around the relatively small number 
of adult players has the capacity to influence a far larger group of players 
whose risks of concussion are higher and whose capacity to consent is 
lower. We are spending a great deal of cultural energy contemplating 
the destruction/entertainment/consent conundrum in professional 
sports, without enough attention to the interplay between professional 
sports and youth concussion risk.45 
II. THE PROBLEM OF TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY (CONCUSSIONS) 
The symptoms of a concussion can be challenging to observe and to 
distinguish from psychological or emotional states like fatigue and heat 
 
 
40
 Jacob Feldman, Bob Costas Supports CLF Initiative to Educate Media Members on 
Concussions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.si.com/tech-
media/2018/11/09/bob-costas-concussion-legacy-foundation-education; see also John 
Branch, ESPN Football Analyst Walks Away, Disturbed By Brain Trauma On Field, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/sports/espn-ed-
cunningham-football-concussions.html (narrating that Ed Cunningham, a prominent 
ESPN commentator, has also walked away from a promising football media career over 
the issue). 
 41 Feldman, supra note 40.  
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 AJ Willingham, Deaths on College and High School Football Fields Are a Rare – But 
Reliable – Tragedy, CNN (Oct. 1, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/ 
09/21/health/football-deaths-season-injuries-high-school-college-trnd/index.html. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 An egregious example of the interplay came in a 2012 Public Service 
Announcement (“PSA”) starring New England’s beloved Tom Brady, in which he 
directly encourages parents to trust the safety of the game. A joke is embedded in the 
PSA: the worried parent who Brady reassures is revealed in the end not to be her minor 
child, as you’ve assumed, but her adult professional player, Baltimore Ravens’ Ray 
Lewis, thereby directly flattening out the distinction between handling NFL risk and 
handling youth risk. BillR2009, Newest NFL Evolution commercial.mp4, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 7, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3iE6Jnh8jU (providing a PSA as 
part of the NFL “Play Smart, Play Safe” campaign); see TEDxYouth, Head Games: Duncan 
Jurayj and Kate Silbaugh at TEDxYouth@BeaconStreet, YOUTUBE (Dec. 28, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcoHs6m25UQ. 
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illness.46 There is no physiological screen for a brain injury, much less 
a rapid screen that can be administered on the sidelines. Headache, 
difficulty focusing, sluggishness, moodiness, fatigue, and nausea are 
common in concussed athletes. But these symptoms are common in 
youth without a concussion as well. The athlete herself becomes the 
crucial source of information about her condition, yet she may not be 
in a state to accurately pinpoint and describe symptoms due to the 
concussion itself, the general limits of her young age, her desire to 
conceal or minimize her symptoms to speed her return to play, or in 
response to the vagueness of the experience of being concussed. 
Researchers have understood for some time that children are more 
vulnerable to concussion than adults in three ways. Children and 
teenagers are more likely to be concussed by an impact, more likely to 
suffer serious long-term consequences from a concussion, and take 
longer to recover from a concussion than adults.47 All three differences 
between youth and adult concussion point toward a higher need to 
protect the under-aged brain independent of differences in the maturity 
needed to assess the risk decision. 
A. Finding Concussion Rates in Youth Sports 
Researchers do not agree on the incident rate of concussions in youth 
sports. In the past, concussions were graded by presumed severity based 
on whether a concussed person lost consciousness (and for how long), 
or exhibited amnesia (and for how long). The use of that grading system 
has diminished with evidence that it did not predict the longevity and 
intensity of concussion symptoms: relatively mild initial symptoms 
could intensify and be prolonged, while relatively intense immediate 
symptoms could abate quickly.48 
Sports are not the primary cause of serious traumatic brain injury; 
falls and car accidents, for example, cause more traumatic brain injury 
 
 46 Keith A. Scorza et al., Current Concepts in Concussion: Evaluation and Management, 
85 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 123, 124 (2012). 
 47 See CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, A FACT SHEET FOR YOUTH SPORTS 
PARENTS (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/youthsports/parents_eng.pdf.  
 
48
 See Christopher C. Giza et al., Summary of Evidence-Based Guideline Update: 
Evaluation and Management of Concussion in Sports: Report of the Guideline Development 
Subcommittee of The American Academy of Neurology, 80 AM. ACAD. NEUROLOGY 2250, 
2252-53 (2013); Gary Mihoces, Group Issues Updated Concussion Guidelines, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 18, 2013, 8:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/18/ 
sports-possible-concussions/1997797/. 
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than sports.49 Nevertheless, the incidence of sports-related concussion 
is routinely underreported due to an obvious error of classification in 
early foundational study of the subject that only included patients who 
had lost consciousness due to their concussions.50 In addition, some 
public health work has suggested that among athletes more than 50% 
of concussions go unreported.51 According to the CDC, during each of 
the years between 2001 and 2010, more than 2.5 million people were 
either hospitalized or went to the emergency room with a traumatic 
brain injury.52 Since many concussions do not come through hospitals, 
the number of annual concussions is not known definitively.53 The problem 
of ascertaining the number has been clearly surfaced in the literature. 
One meta-survey of over 100 studies concluded that: 
[i]n 2013, the researchers calculated an incidence rate of 
between 14 and 24 sports- and recreation-related concussions 
per 1,000 children.54 
 
 49 Julie Winstanley et al., Early Indicators and Contributors to Psychological Distress 
in Relatives During Rehabilitation Following Severe Traumatic Brain Injury: Findings from 
the Brain Injury Outcomes Study, 21 J. HEAD TRAUMA REHAB. 453, 458 (2006). 
 50 That study found 300,000 recreation and sports-related concussions annually, 
and it has long informed thinking about concussion in recreational sports. But another 
study indicates that as few as 8% of concussed individuals lose consciousness. Mark R. 
Schulz et al., Incidence and Risk Factors for Concussion in High School Athletes, North 
Carolina, 1996–1999, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 937, 940 (2004). If it’s appropriate to 
extrapolate from those two CDC numbers, this would mean between 1.6 million and 
3.8 million concussions each year due to sports and recreational activities alone, 
combining adults and youth. Scorza et al., supra note 46. 
 51 Zachary Y. Kerr et al., Disclosure and Non-Disclosure of Concussion and Concussion 
Symptoms in Athletes: Review and Application of the Socio-Ecological Framework, 28 BRAIN 
INJ. 1009, 1011-14 (2014); Timothy B. Meier et al., The Underreporting of Self-Reported 
Symptoms Following Sports-Related Concussion, 18 J. SCI. & MED. SPORT 507, 510 (2014) 
(pointing out that athletes underreport post-concussive symptoms to team medical 
staff). 
 52 Rates of TBI-Related Emergency Department Visits, Hospitalizations, and Deaths — 
United States, 2001–2010, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
traumaticbraininjury/data/rates.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). 
 53 The prior method of counting concussions reflected the prior medical 
understanding that a concussion that involved the loss of consciousness or an 
emergency room visit defined the injury. The medical community has more recently 
concluded that the correlation between the immediate result of a hit and the long term 
sequela is weaker than previously believed and seen the need for a different metric to 
establish the prevalence of concussion overall, and youth athletic concussion in 
particular. 
 54 Carly Rasmussen et al., How Dangerous Are Youth Sports for the Brain? A Review 
of the Evidence, 7 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 67, 91 (2018).  
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This thorough survey of the existing literature is bounded by its sources, 
most of which continue to rely on emergency room visits.55  
Since that survey was completed, a new source of information has 
indicated a higher rate of high school concussion than previously 
understood, fully ten times higher than the meta-survey described 
above. In 2017, the CDC added a question about concussion for the first 
time to its highly valued Youth Risk Behavior Survey (“YRBS”). The 
CDC administers this survey every other year to a large cross-section of 
high school students. The anonymous survey had a sample size in 2017 
of 14,765, and an 81% response rate among the students randomly 
selected to participate. Among high school students alone, the self-
reports indicate 2.5 million students experienced a concussion from 
sports or similar activities in 2017.56 In addition, the survey question 
asked whether students had experienced a concussion “from playing a 
sport or being physically active?” This framing of the question 
eliminates another source of noise in the prior data introduced by car 
accidents or falls, which are the number one cause of traumatic brain 
injury. In other words, asking teenagers whether they’d experienced a 
concussion from playing sports or being physically active, and not 
requiring an emergency room visit, caused the number of concussions 
reported to skyrocket. 
When the new CDC figures are expressed in percentages, a full 15.1% 
of high school students had experienced a sports- or activity-related 
concussion in the past twelve months alone. Among students who 
played on two sports teams in the past twelve months, 22.9% had 
experienced a sports- or activity-related concussion during that period. 
For those who played on three sports teams during that period, the 
figure is 30.3%. As a rough estimate of the risks associated with youth 
athletics, these figures become concerning because of the improved 
understanding of the potential long-term consequences for these 
children. In addition, there is wide variation in prevalence by sport, and 
while some of that variation is obvious (football and ice hockey are 
 
 55 See id. at 122-91. Nevertheless, this work advances our sport-specific estimates 
of risk greatly. For estimates of unreported concussions and those that do not include 
emergency room visits, this survey extrapolated from two surveys that attempted to 
measure unreported concussions, one focused on female middle school soccer players 
and the other on a sample of 1,500 high school football players in Wisconsin. Id. at 91 
n.103. Nonetheless, the incidence this survey produces is slightly lower than many 
other surveys, confusing a number of working hypotheses. 
 56 DePadilla et al., supra note 29. 
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higher frequency), some is less obvious in the absence of good 
information campaigns (e.g., girls’ soccer is high frequency).57 
B. Consequences of Traumatic Brain Injury (Concussion) 
The medical understanding of concussion outcomes has evolved 
dramatically in recent years. According to the CDC, traumatic brain 
injury can lead to temporary or long-term functional deficits to 
cognitive, physical, and emotional health. These changes can be to 
thinking (including memory and reasoning); sensation (including sight 
and balance); language (including communication, expression, and 
understanding); and emotion (including, depression, anxiety, 
personality changes, aggression, acting out, and social 
inappropriateness).58 In addition to these functional changes, 
concussion can cause epilepsy and it appears to increase the risk of 
brain disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease.59 
An adolescent concussion increases the risk of developing multiple 
sclerosis as an adult.60 The evidence of these links has become stronger 
in recent years, though the long-term consequences are not yet 
expressed in the format that would be relevant to a parent: What’s the 
likelihood that my child will suffer these long-term consequences if she 
suffers a concussion? 
There were significant battles between researchers and the NFL over 
the development of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) 
studies, both by Dr. Omalu and by the Boston University CTE Center; 
these have been chronicled at length elsewhere.61 When 
neuropathologist Ann McKee dissected 111 brains of former NFL 
players donated to Boston University’s brain bank, she found that 110 
of 111 had CTE.62 The sample of 111 brains is skewed because those 
suffering neurodegenerative symptoms are most likely to donate their 
 
 57 See Rasmussen et al., supra note 54, at 92. 
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 Hodge & Hubbard, supra note 3, at 31; Potential Effects, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/traumaticbraininjury/outcomes.html [hereinafter 
Potential Effects] (last reviewed Feb. 25, 2019).  
 59 Sources cited supra note 58; INST. MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SPORTS-
RELATED CONCUSSIONS IN YOUTH 222 (2014). 
 60 Scott Montgomery et al., Concussion in Adolescence and Risk of Multiple Sclerosis, 
82 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 554, 556-57 (2017). 
 61 See, e.g., MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL: THE NFL, 
CONCUSSIONS, AND THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH (2013); JEANNE M. LASKAS, CONCUSSION 
(2015). 
 62 Joe Ward et al., 110 N.F.L. Brains, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/25/sports/football/nfl-cte.html. 
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brains to the bank, but even so, the finding is remarkable. For the first 
time, a physiological correlate to the symptoms of post-concussive 
neurodegenerative phenomena could be seen across an enormous 
sample, and to a near-perfect prevalence. CTE is not the only measure 
of harm from traumatic brain injury, but it is demonstrated with 
pathology evidence among a population with a clear history of head 
trauma, and so it anchors one end of the concussion inquiry. A 2017 
study found that 92% of retired NFL players suffered head pain or 
migraine.63 In addition, the NFL’s long-term effort to bury information 
about the dangers of head trauma leave a culture of distrust in the 
information ecology around concussion risk for the population as a 
whole.64 Once the public learns that an intentional effort to conceal risk 
has been undertaken by a powerful entity, it is difficult to know when 
the disinformation has ended and it is safe to trust the updates. 
Against the backdrop of this skepticism, the concrete evidence 
surrounding youth and concussion outcomes is a combination of 
concerning and incomplete. But the evidence points toward the 
conclusion that youth concussion is more dangerous than adult concussion 
along every relevant measure.  
Youth are more likely to sustain concussions than adults.65 Youth are 
also slower to recover from concussion than adults; they are more likely 
to be in the prolonged recovery group.66 Symptoms tend to be more 
acute and to last longer in minors.67 While concussion symptoms abate 
for most people within a week, they last longer for approximately 10% 
of people, and among that prolonged recovery group, symptoms are still 
 
 63 Evans, supra note 34.  
 64 See Matt Vasilogambros, The NFL’s Concussion Cover-Up, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/05/nfls-concussion-cover-up/ 
484016/.  
 65 Annie Baillargeon et al., Neuropsychological and Neurophysiological Assessment of 
Sport Concussion in Children, Adolescents and Adults, 26 BRAIN INJ. 211, 212 (2012); RACHEL 
RAMSDEN ET AL., B.C. INJ. RES. & PREVENTION UNIT, CONCUSSION AMONG CHILDREN AND 
YOUTH IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, at ii (2016), http://www.injuryresearch.bc.ca/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/01/Concussion-in-Interior-Health-Jan_27_2016-FINAL.pdf; see Tracey 
Covassin et al., The Role of Age and Sex in Symptoms, Neurocognitive Performance, and 
Postural Stability in Athletes After Concussion, 40 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1303, 1304, 1310 
(2012) (discussing the increased severity of concussion symptoms in high school versus 
collegiate athletes). 
 66 Grant L. Iverson et al., Predictors of Clinical Recovery from Concussion: A 
Systematic Review, 51 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 941, 942 (2017). 
 67 Paul McCrory et al., Summary and Agreement Statement of the 2nd International 
Conference on Concussion in Sport, Prague 2004, 39 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 196, 197 (2005); 
see also Baillargeon et al., supra note 65, at 212. 
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reported up to 45-90 days post-concussion.68 Loss of consciousness 
correlates with prolonged recovery, but the correlation is not as strong 
as was once believed.69 Youth who have already experienced and 
recovered from one concussion are more likely to experience prolonged 
symptoms if they experience a second concussion.70  
The CDC explains that repeated concussions can lead to cumulative 
deficits, while repeated concussions close together in time can be fatal:  
Repeated mild TBIs occurring over an extended period of time 
can result in cumulative neurological and cognitive deficits. 
Repeated mild TBIs occurring within a short period of time (i.e., 
hours, days, or weeks) can be catastrophic or fatal.71 
Two concussions occurring close together in time can lead to a 
phenomenon sometimes referred to as second-impact syndrome, which 
can lead to fatal swelling in the brain.72 This phenomenon is likely 
implicated in most or all of the deaths of the high school football players 
described earlier. The risk that this will occur is low, but the 
consequence is dire. In addition, the fatality can be surprising relative 
to the hit. While parents may know that their child can die from a 
catastrophic traumatic brain injury in an automobile accident, they do 
not appreciate that two moderate, or even mild, blows to the head 
within the same game or practice could carry that extraordinary 
consequence. In addition, second-impact syndrome is avoidable if 
athletes are removed from play after experiencing the first concussion.73 
Second-impact syndrome is a good target for an information campaign 
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both because the phenomenon is not obvious and because information 
can lead to actions that avoid the harm. At the same time, it is only one 
of the risks of concussion, and not the most prevalent of either the 
short- or the long-term consequences risked when exposed to traumatic 
brain injury.74 
The unanswered question is this: How many apparently mild 
concussions will have long-term consequences?75 Some evidence from 
soccer suggests that cognitive harm can result from multiple sub-
concussive hits, including from heading the ball.76 But what is the rate 
of long-term consequences? There is evidence that one-quarter of youth 
concussions include some amnesia.77 One study found that those who 
experience amnesia are more likely to suffer memory and attention 
issues two decades later.78 The strength of the association between 
prolonged recovery and long-term consequences is unclear. Evidence 
suggests that approximately 15% of those experiencing concussion 
“suffer from deficits one year after injury.”79 One study compared a 
group of adult athletes who had suffered their last concussion thirty 
years ago to a control group of adult athletes who had no history of 
concussion. Those with no concussion history had superior cognitive 
functioning across a variety of tasks, compared to those who had a 
concussion 30 years ago.80 It appears that the plasticity of the youth 
brain makes it more vulnerable to long-term cognitive impairment.81 
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(2010). 
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These findings do not present a clear overall risk magnitude, but neither 
are they reassuring. They indicate that some significant proportion of 
youth athletes — 15%? more? less? — will experience a concussion 
each year, 10–15% of those will have a prolonged recovery, and either 
group runs a heightened risk of cognitive deficits in the present and of 
neurodegenerative disease decades later. When the incomplete state of 
the research was combined with the revelation that concussion risk had 
been minimized and concealed by professional athletic leagues, 
pressure built to intervene on behalf of youth athletes. 
Taken together, all of the new information about youth risk led to 
pressure on state legislatures to take action to protect children from 
traumatic brain injury. From this pressure, catalyzed by one concussion 
victim in Washington State, the Lystedt structure emerged. 
III. LYSTEDT LAWS 
In 2009, Washington State became the first to pass a concussion 
return to play law, commonly called the Lystedt law. By 2015, all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia had followed suit,82 a remarkably 
quick legislative timetable for change.83 As a number of commentators 
have observed, the rapid pace of legislative adoption did not allow for 
time to research the efficacy of the Lystedt model, yet the model became 
the blueprint for nationwide standards.84 Indeed, in 2010, NFL 
Commissioner Roger Goodell wrote a letter to governors urging them 
to pass legislation modeled on the Lystedt elements.85 With the NFL 
backing and the urgency of the issue increasing in the public dialogue, 
the Lystedt model became the default nationwide, even though its 
efficacy had not been tested and its underlying theory not subject to 
thorough critical evaluation. 
A. Lystedt’s Return to Play Framework 
Lystedt laws are not aimed at preventing mild or moderate long-term 
consequences of concussion. Instead, they are aimed almost exclusively 
 
 82 Traumatic Brain Injury Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURE (Oct. 
11, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/traumatic-brain-injury-legislation.aspx.  
 
83
 See id. (providing most up to date status of state legislation and tracking 
legislative activity and provides access to statutory language by state). 
 84 Lowrey & Morain, supra note 3, at 298; see also Hosea H. Harvey, Reducing 
Traumatic Brain Injuries in Youth Sports: Youth Sports Traumatic Brain Injury State Laws, 
January 2009–December 2012, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1249, 1250 (2013). 
 85 Goodell Sends Letter to 44 Governors, ESPN (May 23, 2010), http://www.espn. 
com/nfl/news/story?id=5212326 [hereafter Goodell Sends Letter]. 
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at preventing concussed youth players from returning to play and 
thereby finding themselves at risk for catastrophic second-impact 
syndrome. To accomplish this goal, the laws generally consist of three 
components. First, the strongest laws usually call for the education or 
training of coaches, athletes, and parents, so that they will recognize the 
signs of a concussion. Second, the laws generally contain a requirement 
that an athlete showing signs of concussion must be removed from play 
for evaluation. Finally, the laws usually include a requirement that such 
athletes may not return to play until a designated health care provider, 
ranging from a physician to a school trainer, depending on the state, 
clears the student for play.86 These laws aim to reduce the number of 
youth players who experience life-threatening second hits after they 
have already been concussed. To reduce that risk, coaches, players, and 
parents need the skill to recognize that a concussion may have occurred, 
and they need to know what to do: remove the child from play and do 
not allow her to return until she is healed in the view of a designated 
expert. 
1. Information for Whom? 
The educational components of the laws vary from state to state. In 
general, though, these laws require coaches, parents, and/or student 
athletes to receive information about concussion, ordinarily through 
dissemination of printed information. Half of the states do not require 
coaches to receive any training for how to deal with an apparently 
concussed athlete, ostensibly the heart of second-impact prevention.87 
Only twenty-nine states require coaches to even receive passive 
information about concussion risk, short of training. Only seven states 
require referees to receive concussion training, though they would seem 
to be essential to a legislative scheme designed to respond effectively to 
second-impact risk.88 Only forty-four states require the athlete 
themselves to receive even passive information. Yet forty-nine states 
require parents to receive concussion information. Parents are the most 
consistent target of the information across the state statutory schemes. 
They are the organizing feature of that information campaign. 
 
 86 NAT’L CTR. INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, IMPLEMENTING RETURN TO PLAY 8-9, 
https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/policy/rtp_implementation-a.pdf (last visited July 
24, 2019). 
 87 Lau, supra note 3, at 2889-91. 
 88 Kim et al., supra note 3, at 174.  
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2. Efficacy 
There has been little study of the efficacy of the legislation,89 and what 
there is shows mixed results. On the one hand, coaches in particular 
appear to be better educated on the risk and harms of concussion than 
they were prior to enactment of the laws, while athletes show less 
improvement.90 A recent survey of the research on the efficacy of 
Lystedt describes the study design of each evaluation, and remarkably, 
parents have not been surveyed or studied. The efficacy studies have 
focused instead on the impressions of health care providers, coaches, 
athletes, and others in the league and school orbits.91 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, coaches and schools identify parents as an impediment 
to effective enforcement of the legislation.92 We can only speculate 
about whether parents would say the same of them, because it appears 
no study has considered them a key data source when evaluating the 
efficacy of the legislation. This is a noteworthy oversight given that 
parents are the consensus target of information across state variation for 
other constituencies. 
The Lystedt laws contain a return to play protocol, and in forty-seven 
states, a healthcare provider needs to decide that an athlete is cleared 
for play. Only twenty-five states require such healthcare providers to be 
trained in concussion, either by virtue of their profession or through a 
specific training.93 
3. Post-concussion Focus 
Parent information provided under the Lystedt statutes is generally 
limited to post-concussion related information: What are the signs of a 
concussion, and what are the return to play protocols? If risk 
information is conveyed, it tends to be about returning to play, not 
about the underlying primary concussion risk in that sport or in youth 
sports in general.94 Indeed, the CDC parent information sheet, which is 
 
 89 See Kathryn Coxe et al., Consistency and Variation in School-Level Youth Sports 
Traumatic Brain Injury Policy Content, 62 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 255, 256 (2017); Shen, 
supra note 3, at 8. But see Lowrey & Morain, supra note 3, at 290-91. 
 90 Chrisman, supra note 3, at 1192-93.  
 91 See Shen, supra note 3. 
 92 Id. at 19 (stating that the author is conducting a survey that has not yet been 
published that includes parents). 
 93 Kim et al., supra note 3, at 175. 
 94 See, e.g., CITY OF KIRKLAND PARKS & CMTY. SERVS. DEP’T YOUTH SPORTS, ZACKERY 
LYSTEDT LAW – CONCUSSION / HEAD INJURY AND SUDDEN CARDIAC ARREST POLICIES (2014), 
https://www.kirklandwa.gov/Assets/Parks/Parks+PDFs/Parks_Features/Lystedt+Law+ 
Agreement.pdf. 
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designed to assist states in putting together information to comply with 
these statutes, contains information only about recognizing a 
concussion, seeking medical treatment, and following return to play 
protocols, but no information about the background risk of primary 
concussion or its potential long-term consequences.95 The information 
provided does not invite parents to make an overall pre-participation 
risk assessment using appropriate information to that task. To make 
that assessment, parents would need to learn about their child’s overall 
risk of concussion and the long-term consequences of concussion.96 
4. Immunity from Tort Liability 
While these laws place a burden on school districts and coaches, 
twenty-four of them offer in exchange complete immunity from lawsuit 
to actors within the system, such as coaches, schools, trainers, or 
physicians, who properly followed the specific return to play protocols 
set out in the statute.97 This immunity is a powerful rollback of the 
underlying tort law in the area, which would ordinarily hold school 
districts and coaches responsible for the exercise of due care in running 
athletic programs, not just in the narrow return to play protocols 
covered by the Lystedt framework. 
B. Deficiencies in the Lystedt Law 
Many scholars have criticized aspects of the Lystedt laws, particularly 
in states that enacted weaker versions.98  
 
 95 CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PARENT & ATHLETE CONCUSSION 
INFORMATION SHEET, https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/custom/headsupconcussion_ 
parent_athlete_info.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (inviting coaches and schools to 
customize the handouts with their team logo); see also CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, A FACT SHEET FOR PARENTS, https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/ 
schools/tbi_factsheets_parents-508-a.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 
 96 See Rasmussen et al., supra note 54, at 71 (arguing that this primary risk 
information should be assessed and provided prior to participation to improve risk 
decision-making). 
 97 See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5323(i) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3313.539(G)(2) (2014); WIS. STAT. § 118.293(5)(a) (2013); see also, Kim et al., supra 
note 3 (pointing out that twenty-four states provide immunity to those that comply with 
the statute’s return to play protocols). 
 98 Spaude, supra note 3, at 1113-14.  
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1. Minimal Coverage, Thin Operations 
While state law varies widely on the way each of these elements are 
handled, several general aspects of these laws have come under scrutiny. 
For example, many laws don’t cover enough athletes, as many are 
limited to public high school athletes only and fail to address private 
school, middle school, or youth league athletes. In addition, many laws 
don’t require sufficient baseline cognitive testing that would allow for 
more accurate post-hit concussion diagnosis. Some would like to see 
laws that require sideline health care providers, despite the difficulty of 
providing them in rural areas in particular. Some of the laws allow 
return to play sign-off from medical care para-professionals who may 
not have adequate concussion knowledge.99 In addition, most laws don’t 
adequately address issues concussed students have in returning to the 
classroom, as distinct from the playing field. Moreover, the laws treat a 
“cleared” player as completely cured, rather than tightening removal or 
return to play protocols for players who have suffered one or more prior 
concussions, and are therefore at an even higher risk of second-impact 
syndrome and of prolonged recovery periods. The legal literature has 
also raised questions about the adequacy of the information given to 
coaches, athletes, and parents, and about the ability of a concussed 
athlete to make a meaningful decision in a state of cognitive 
impairment.100 
2. No Primary Prevention 
While each of these critiques is significant, by far the most significant 
failure of the Lystedt legislative structure is that it does nothing to 
minimize the risks of suffering a first concussion, as it contains no 
primary prevention strategy. Given the enormous infrastructure of 
parental, coach, and athlete information generated by these laws across 
fifty states, it seems a glaring omission to skip straight to the second 
concussion and entirely ignore health, awareness, and prevention of the 
first. But that’s precisely what the Lystedt framework does. It structures 
a landscape where first concussions are inevitable and are day one of 
the risk, such that a child’s first concussion initiates the call to action, 
rather than the child’s participation in contact sports. Lystedt contains 
no primary prevention incentives. Arguably, by focusing on post-
 
 99 See William P. Meehan III, Assessment and Management of Sport-Related 
Concussions in United States High Schools, 39 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 2304, 2308 (2011).  
 100 See generally sources cited supra note 3.  
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concussion protocols, Lystedt draws the attention of athletes and 
parents away from the question of primary prevention. 
The CDC describes the appropriate response to sports concussion 
risk as follows: 
To minimize TBI in sports and recreation activities, primary and 
secondary prevention strategies should be implemented. 
Primary prevention strategies include: 1) using protective 
equipment (e.g., a bicycle helmet) that is appropriate for the 
activity or position, fits correctly, is well maintained, and is used 
consistently and correctly; 2) coaching appropriate sport-specific 
skills with an emphasis on safe practices and proper technique; 3) 
adhering to rules of play with good sportsmanship and strict 
officiating; and 4) attention to strength and conditioning. 
Secondary prevention strategies include increasing awareness of 
the signs and symptoms of TBI and recognizing and responding 
quickly and appropriately to suspected TBI.101 
These are clear medical recommendations to focus on primary 
prevention strategies as well as to improve return to play protocols.102 
Yet Lystedt legislation fails to capture or address any of the thorny 
questions around the optimal design and usage practices of protective 
equipment,103 the crucial role of officiating in preventing concussion,104 
and whether required strength training could play a preventive role in 
concussion.105 These CDC-recommended practices pose very little 
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 Nonfatal Traumatic Brain Injuries Related to Sports and Recreation Activities Among 
Persons Aged ≤ 19 Years — United States, 2001-2009, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1337 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 102 L. Syd M. Johnson, Return to Play Guidelines Cannot Solve the FootballRelated 
Concussion Problem, 82 J. SCH. HEALTH 180, 180-85 (2012). 
 103 Jason Navia, Note, Sitting on the Bench: The Failure of Youth Football Helmet 
Regulation and the Necessity of Government Intervention, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 268 
(2012). 
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 R. Dawn Comstock et al., An Evidence-Based Discussion of Heading the Ball And 
Concussions In High School Soccer, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 830, 836 (2015); Ken Belson, 
A 5-Concussion Pee Wee Game Leads to Penalties for the Adults, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/sports/football/pee-wee-football-game-
with-concussions-brings-penalties-for-adults.html. 
 105 James T. Eckner et al., Effect of Neck Muscle Strength and Anticipatory Cervical 
Muscle Activation on the Kinematic Response of the Head to Impulsive Loads, 42 AM. J. 
SPORTS MED. 566, 566-76 (2014). See generally Abrams supra note 3, at 12-13 
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Abrams, Confronting the Youth Sports Concussions Crisis: A Central Role for Responsible 
Local Enforcement of Playing Rules, 2 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 75, 88-89 (2013) 
(modifications to rules of play are only effective when properly enforced); Douglas E. 
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harm to sports as currently conceived, and have the potential to prevent 
that first concussion. Yet Lystedt legislation across the country, passed 
to protect youth athletes from the negative effects of concussion, gives 
no attention to these potential interventions, and develops no 
framework for ensuring that they are considered. 
3. Tackling Changes to the Practices and Rules of the Game 
Given that even these relatively minor interventions are not 
incentivized or required by Lystedt, it should be no surprise that 
nothing in the Lystedt structure nudges athletic leagues or schools 
toward the more difficult problem of adjusting rules of play. Some 
organizations up and down the age scale are slowly moving in this 
direction on their own. For example, the NFL has eliminated two-a-day 
padded practices,106 and the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) recently followed suit.107 The Ivy League recently eliminated 
all full-contact hitting practices.108 Some youth leagues are also 
experimenting with adjustments, such as postponing heading of the ball 
in soccer until age ten and limiting it until age fourteen, and postponing 
checking in hockey. Leagues are reducing the type and amount of 
contact in practices in Pop Warner football,109 and experimenting with 
rule changes to games, such as eliminating special teams and requiring 
players to match up against similarly sized opponents.110 The NFL 
recently moved the kickoff line from the thirty to the thirty-five yard 
line, and ESPN has reported that the NFL is considering eliminating the 
 
Abrams, Player Safety in Youth Sports: Sportsmanship and Respect as an Injury-Prevention 
Strategy, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 12-13 (2012) (achieving the protective 
purpose of playing rules depends on parents, coaches, officials, and league 
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kickoff entirely because the play produces so many injuries.111 The Ivy 
League moved the kickoff line from the 35-yard line to the 40-yard line, 
and concussions fell from 11 per 1,000 kicks to 2 per 1,000 kicks.112  
Leagues weigh rule changes at their own pace, but nothing in the 
Lystedt laws incentivizes focus on these issues. The Lystedt laws bypass 
regulating anything that would pressure leagues to prevent first 
concussions, turning instead to the most deadly risk — second-impact 
— implicitly assuming that a first impact is natural or unavoidable. It’s 
almost as if the Lystedt law is deliberately designed to optimize an 
inverse balance between a show of concern around the issue and 
effective exploration of or incentive toward reduction and prevention of 
overall youth concussion rates. Indeed, by granting immunity from tort 
suits, Lystedt reduces pressure to focus on these safety adjustments that 
might be expected from insurance companies. The leagues are 
responding to public relations pressures and genuine concern for player 
health and the ethical concerns of volunteer adults in the system, but 
the concussed individuals will need to rely on these indirect pressures 
rather than the state legislatures or private insurers to apply pressure 
toward achieving the optimal safety measures. 
This attribute of the Lystedt Laws — that they address only second-
impact, return to play rules — is remarkably consistent across the fifty 
states, even as other aspects of the laws vary. Massachusetts is the only 
jurisdiction that appears to address primary prevention. Its 2010 
legislation provides:  
A coach, trainer or volunteer for an extracurricular athletic 
activity shall not encourage or permit a student participating in 
the activity to engage in any unreasonably dangerous athletic 
technique that unnecessarily endangers the health of a student, 
including using a helmet or any other sports equipment as a 
weapon.113 
In every other state, the really difficult question is expertly deflected 
by the Lystedt structure: What level of sports risk to the brain is 
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appropriate for children? We are dancing around the outside of this 
difficult question culturally in the media and in communities as parents 
and local youth sports organizations absorb the waves of information 
on both the prevalence and the long-term consequences of concussions. 
When a question is difficult culturally, we have several outlets where 
we might place decisions against a backdrop of uncertainty. We might 
regulate. We might let the tort system and insurance companies manage 
a risk calculus and the development of a standard, without a legislative 
grant of immunity. Or we might provide information and leave the 
decision-making to individuals. But in the case of youth sports, the 
individuals to whom we entrust the decisions are not the ones at risk. 
This is not how we treat other culturally contested risks to youth, such 
as alcohol or tobacco. 
C. Lawsuits Before and After Lystedt 
It was already difficult to sue school districts for sports injuries before 
the Lystedt laws. Sports injuries are a known risk, to some extent, in 
every sport, and concussed athletes need to overcome an assumption of 
risk defense. While assumption of risk is disfavored in most areas of tort 
law because of the emergence of comparative fault, sports participation 
continues to be one realm where assumption of risk survives.114 We are 
inclined to think that sports injuries result from inherent risks of the 
sport and not from the negligent conduct of school authorities. But the 
process of concluding that a risk is “inherent” rather than the result of 
negligence can be conclusory, particularly when the idea that a risk is 
inherent incorporates rules of play as though they have been and will 
continue to be constant over time. In addition, many government 
entities were already partially insulated from large judgments either by 
damage caps or complete immunities for schools under certain 
conditions.  
Whatever the difficulties of suit were before, the Lystedt laws 
narrowed the possibility of suit by extending immunity in many states 
to those coaches and schools that comply with the return to play 
protocol. In so doing, the Lystedt laws frame, define, and narrow the 
duty to prevent injury, such that second-impact syndrome is the risk 
that coaches, and insurers, must concern themselves with, to the 
exclusion of other risks. Game or practice drills or strategies that 
 
 114 Timothy Davis, Avila v. Citrus Community College District: Shaping the Contours 
of Immunity and Primary Assumption of the Risk, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 259, 268 
(2006); Keya Denner, Comment, Taking One for the Team: The Role of Assumption of the 
Risk in Sports Tort Cases, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 209, 209 (2004). 
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increase the likelihood of an initial injury escape scrutiny under the 
Lystedt framework, and are immunized from tort law. In focusing 
energy on the admittedly crucial return to play decision, the Lystedt 
laws cut off ordinary development of legal pressures on other aspects of 
sports decision-making.  
The NFL actively promoted Lystedt laws in state legislatures.115 One 
study of the Lystedt policy-making process between 2009-2012 
concludes: 
that the NFL, through its unique role as a dominant interest 
group, established the content of states’ youth sports TBI laws. 
The NFL’s vigorous advocacy caused state legislatures to act 
swiftly, which minimized the role of scientific evidence and 
policy experimentation in the youth sports TBI lawmaking 
process.116 
Whether by design or result, these laws protect the continuation of 
contact high school football programs by focusing on post-concussion 
response rather than primary prevention and by immunizing athletic 
programs from the lawsuits that might drive safety-enhancing change 
in game rules. By framing the youth concussion risk as one of second-
impact prevention, Lystedt draws the attention of athletic leagues and 
schools away from primary prevention, while lifting the common law 
tort litigation risk that might have pressured those same actors to 
consider primary prevention before the Lystedt structure was in place. 
In their assigned role under the Lystedt laws, parents play an 
underappreciated but essential part in furtherance of Lystedt’s status 
quo protective operation, one that stretches rather than reflects the 
conception of parents in other areas of law. 
D. Lystedt as a Consent Law 
Lystedt arms families with information that will help them to avoid 
second-impact syndrome in their child. This seems like a prevention 
framework. Yet I am arguing that we can treat the Lystedt laws as an 
inform-and-consent framework, albeit a particularly weak and 
incomplete one. This characterization requires some unpacking. 
Arguably, Lystedt laws are more proactive than simple consents to 
concussion risk, as they are designed to prevent return to play of a 
concussed athlete. Second-impact syndrome is not the only way people 
suffer from traumatic brain injury, but it has been identified as a 
 
 115 Goodell Sends Letter, supra note 85. 
 116 Harvey, supra note 3, at 85. 
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particularly serious risk. On this view, the most important goal of 
educating parents, coaches, and athletes is not to improve the quality of 
their consent, but to make sure that they act appropriately after signs of 
a first concussion. By contrast, the information in a typical waiver, for 
example, includes an exhaustive list of risks, with no goal of reducing 
many of those risks, but rather a legal aim of perfecting the waiver of 
future liability for what comes to pass. Lystedt conveys risk ostensibly 
for the purpose of enabling relevant actors to recognize a concussion 
toward a different end: keeping an athlete off the field after one has 
happened to prevent further injury. This distinguishes Lystedt from the 
more typical consent to risk found in waivers. An examination of the 
structure of Lystedt, however, indicates that it may formally be a 
prevention statute, but its design points to an informal waiver of liability 
or assumption of risk function. 
In most states, parents in particular are signing statements that 
indicate that they’ve received risk information about concussion.117 This 
information sheet comes home in the same way other densely packed 
waivers arrive on a parent’s table: this needs a signature or the child 
can’t play. The form of the communication of information is the same 
one used to execute a waiver of liability; indeed, almost all sports 
programs require that a waiver is signed before participation, and the 
two papers can come together and seem indistinguishable. 
In addition, recall that forty-nine states require parents to receive this 
information, more than the number of states that require the same of 
athletes or coaches. The parent information requirement is the most 
consistent across all of the Lystedt “inform” provisions. Yet the parent 
is the only one of the three who may not be present when the injury 
occurs and a removal from play decision needs to be made. If prevention 
is the heart of Lystedt, coaches and referees would be the primary focus. 
The universal focus on the parent begs some examination of the function 
of Lystedt: parents contribute legitimacy to children’s risk more than 
they bring an ability to prevent harm. 
To underscore the ambiguity about why we inform parents under the 
Lystedt framework, in fully eighteen states, the statute seems to require 
the parent to return the concussion information to the school along 
with the signature. That is to say, the information is not available to the 
parent for reference throughout the season, ostensibly the time it would 
 
 117 E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.190(2) (2019) (“On a yearly basis, a concussion 
and head injury information sheet shall be signed and returned by the youth athlete and 
the athlete’s parent and/or guardian prior to the youth athlete’s initiating practice or 
competition.”). 
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be most useful.118 Consider the following examples of language in 
versions of Lystedt legislation: 
Oklahoma: On an annual basis, a concussion and head injury 
information sheet shall be completed and returned to the school 
district by the youth athlete and the athlete’s parent or guardian prior 
to the youth athlete’s participation in practice or competition.119 
Indiana: Each year, before beginning practice for an interscholastic 
or intramural sport, a student athlete and the student athlete’s parent: 
 (1) must be given the information sheet and form described in 
section 2 of this chapter; and 
 (2) shall sign and return the form acknowledging the receipt of 
the information to the student athlete’s coach. The coach shall 
maintain a file of the completed forms.120 
Montana: A form documenting that educational materials referred to 
in subsection (1) have been provided to and viewed by each youth 
athlete and the youth athlete’s parent or guardian must be signed by 
each youth athlete and the youth athlete’s parent or guardian and 
returned to an official designated by the school district, nonpublic 
school, or youth athletic organization prior to the youth athlete’s 
participation in organized youth athletic activities.121 
Pennsylvania: A student participating in or desiring to participate in 
an athletic activity and the student’s parent or guardian shall each 
school year, prior to participation by the student in an athletic 
activity, sign and return to the student’s school an acknowledgment 
of receipt and review of a concussion and traumatic brain injury 
information sheet developed under this subsection.122 
 
 118 See Christine M. Baugh et al., Requiring Athletes to Acknowledge Receipt of 
Concussion-Related Information and Responsibility to Report Symptoms: A Study of the 
Prevalence, Variation, and Possible Improvements, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 297, 299-302 
(2014). 
 119 S.B. 1700, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (noting that though in a 2016 
version of the bill the statute was revised, but not particularly improved on this issue: 
“On an annual basis, information regarding concussion and head injuries shall be 
disseminated to the athlete and his or her parent or guardian. Acknowledgment and 
understanding of the information shall be completed by the athlete and the athlete’s 
parent or guardian and maintained by the school or the youth sports organization or 
association prior to the athlete’s participation in practice or competition.”) (citing OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 70, § 24-155(C)(1)-(2) (2016)). 
 120 IND. CODE ANN. § 20-34-7-3 (2019). 
 121 MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1303 (2017). 
 122 S.B. 200, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).  
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In some of these statutes, the instruction to return seems absolute, 
while in others it leaves room conceptually for the development of a 
tear-off sheet. Yet, the return of the signature is the statutory 
requirement, and we might expect therefore that school systems will 
focus on the aspect of the mandate that proves compliance. Their best 
defensive strategy, and the most straightforward, is to put the signature 
on the information sheet itself. A study of how this kind of statutory 
language is implemented indicates that in these states, the entire 
educational content is returned with the signature.123 
For the concussion information to assist a parent who is trying to 
make a decision about whether to seek medical attention for her child 
or to discourage her child’s participation in practice or games after a hit 
to the head, it would seem that the symptom list would be most useful 
after the child has been permitted to participate in sports. This is 
arguably a simple design flaw in the legislation. Forms that require 
parental signatures in other contexts sometimes include a tear-off 
portion that lets a family keep critical field trip details on a kitchen 
counter, for example, while returning the permission signature. Lystedt 
laws and structure should certainly correct this design flaw. But I 
surface the flaw not solely to correct it, but because it reveals the 
informed consent and waiver-like ethos behind the Lystedt structure 
and operation. 
Imagine, for example, a first aid instruction course that required 
students to return all information upon completion. It’s unthinkable 
that you’d try to create agency in amateur emergency first responders 
by giving them first aid information and then take that information 
away from them. The transparent incoherence of such a design suggests 
that the structure of Lystedt is too substantially and too obviously 
different from a first aid instruction to indicate that its core function is 
first aid (or post-hit prevention of second-impact syndrome). The best 
case statement of the purpose of Lystedt is to arm parents with an action 
plan in the event of a concussion, but the function of Lystedt is to gain 
parents’ informed acknowledgement of the risks and symptoms of 
youth sports concussion. I return again to a quote by a prominent 
scholar from the introduction to this Article, which says of Lystedt: 
Such contrasting views [about risk] make it difficult for 
policymakers to know what, exactly, to do. The policy challenge 
going forward is thus to facilitate accurate communication of 
 
 123 See Baugh et al., supra note 118, at 301-02. 
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risks and benefits to allow for informed athlete and parent 
decision-making.124 
In addition, the statutory requirements in some Lystedt information 
packets are not limited to signs and symptoms of brain injury and 
instructions to seek medical attention and follow return to play 
protocols. They sometimes contain requirements that parents and 
athletes receive explicit basic information about brain injuries in sports, 
the kind of information that does not help families to prevent second 
concussions and second-impact syndrome, but instead ensures that 
they approach the activity with knowledge of its injury risk.125 This 
additional information is of course essential if the parent signature is de 
facto a waiver of liability. But the parent is not invited to view the 
information provided as a decision point, in the way a parent is invited 
to view waivers. The parts are there — risk information, and a fork in 
the road — but in the case of a parental waiver, the parent is explicitly 
invited to assume the relevant risk. Even though waivers of liability are 
more direct in their purpose, courts are skeptical of enforcement given 
the choice architecture in parental waivers of liability.126 The Lystedt 
information is offered for more ambiguous purposes than a waiver of 
liability, and its inferior design should lead to even more skeptical 
reception. Instead, it leads to immunity from liability, a unique safe 
haven for concussion harms not extended to other youth injuries. 
Moreover, some implementing agencies use the term “informed 
consent” in discussing the required Lystedt compliance documents. For 
example, the original Zachary Lystedt law itself doesn’t use the words 
“informed consent” because it is ostensibly aimed at second-impact 
prevention. But the statute is implemented by the Washington State 
Department of Health, where a five-point bullet list of compliance 
requirements includes this language: 
Informed consent must be signed by parents and youth athletes 
about the dangers of sports-related head injuries.127 
 
 124 Shen, supra note 3, at 9.  
 125 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.0438(2)(e) (2018) (“An independent sanctioning authority 
shall: (e) Adopt guidelines to educate athletic coaches, officials, administrators, and 
youth athletes and their parents or guardians of the nature and risk of concussion and 
head injury.”).  
 126 See infra Part IV.B.  
 127 Concussion Management for Schools, WASH. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, 
https://www.doh.wa.gov/CommunityandEnvironment/Schools/EnvironmentalHealth/
ConcussionManagement (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).  
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The statutory structure provides more benefit than just setting 
families up for truly informed consent, of course, because the 
information about second-impact risk and removal from play can save 
lives. But even the removal from play and return to play protocol reflects 
the format of informed consent: parents are urged to remove their child 
from participation in the activity for the child’s benefit, but hand in 
glove, parents will share the responsibility for any failure to do so or 
any premature return to play, despite significant flaws in their capacity 
to execute effectively in this area.128 It’s difficult to tease out the 
difference between information that reduces injury and information 
that implicates parents in the risks that their children face. 
Consider one of the more in-depth statutory requirements for the four 
pieces of information that a parent should receive: 
(a) the nature and risk of brain injuries associated with athletic 
activity; 
(b) the signs, symptoms, and behaviors consistent with a brain 
injury; 
(c) the need to alert a licensed health care professional for 
urgent recognition and treatment when a youth athlete exhibits 
signs, symptoms, or behaviors consistent with a concussion; 
and 
(d) the need to follow proper medical direction and protocols 
for treatment and returning to play after a youth athlete sustains 
a concussion.129 
This is all useful information, depending on the background ecology 
in which it is offered. If risk is to be born entirely by athletes, better that 
a parent is armed with this information than not, if the family is to have 
a fighting chance at addressing the youth sports landscape effectively. 
But the immunity from suit in the Lystedt structure hints at an effort to 
decentralize responsibility for youth concussion risk, and in that 
scheme, parents play not just a functional role but an ideological one, 
for the benefit of anyone with a stake in the game.130 Parents are the fig 
leaf, armed with information but not with the power to modify the 
primary risk landscape. If a child is injured in sports, sports programs 
 
 128 See infra Part V.C.2. 
 129 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 20-7-1303 (2017). 
 130 Those with a stake in the game range from other athletes, their families, adults 
invested in youth sports, and those professionally engaged in collegiate or professional 
sports who need the pipeline to be well-supported. 
  
2019] The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk 233 
can point to Lystedt disclosures and signatures as evidence that risks 
were knowingly undertaken, which is a core element of an assumption 
of risk defense. Families cannot say they weren’t warned. At least in this 
way, the Lystedt disclosures are the worst of all worlds. They defend 
school systems and sports programs against the claim that parents were 
not informed of risk, but they do not invite parents to explicitly consent 
to concussion risk. Rather, parents are told they are preparing 
themselves to take action after one has occurred. Nothing in the 
structure of the disclosures invites families to make a conscious choice 
about primary risk, but the structure allows us to feel later that they’ve 
made one. The Lystedt paperwork returned by parents is inferior to a 
waiver because it does not focus on the possibility of primary 
prevention, nor does it explicitly invite a parental decision to accept or 
reject that primary risk by using the formal language of waiver of 
liability. Worse, the forms parents see do not put parents on notice that 
ordinary negligence liability has been removed by statute solely for 
concussion injury. While the Lystedt format is inferior to parental 
waivers in these ways, the paperwork ritual is more consequential than 
a formal parental waiver, because so many jurisdictions refuse to 
enforce such waivers, while so many jurisdictions have nonetheless 
insulated sports and medical entities from liability for the consequences 
of a concussion. 
IV. MEET THE PARENTS: THE FOUNDATION OF THE LYSTEDT 
FRAMEWORK 
This Part begins with a brief overview of the law of parental decision-
making with respect to important health and risk choices on behalf of 
their children. As many commentators have noted, it is exceedingly 
difficult to make order out of the law of children’s capacity to make 
decisions; wide variation across different contexts is difficult to 
explain.131 Making matters worse, almost no legal scholarship working 
to sort out children’s maturity and capacity independently elaborates a 
full theory of the parent as decision-maker, except in contrast to the 
child as decision-maker. Theory of parent law is less developed than 
theory of child law with respect to decision-making legitimacy and 
 
 131 See, e.g., Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive 
and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 275 (2006); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless 
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265 (2000); Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, 
Minor Restrictions: Adolescence Across Legal Disciplines, the Infancy Doctrine, and the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 61 KAN. L. REV. 343 (2012). 
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capacity.132 At this point, we can make only the claim that parents are 
empowered to make highly significant decisions for children in some 
contexts, but are constrained from doing so in other contexts. Parental 
authority is strong but situational. I argue that a weak understanding of 
parents in their legal role masks the risk of exploitation of their role by 
external actors. Often, gaining parental consent protects third parties as 
much if not more than it protects children. The Part then examines the 
legal regime governing parental waivers of liability on behalf of 
children, as the waiver framework is important to evaluating the Lystedt 
structure.  
A. The Rights of Parents to Make Decisions 
The right of the parent to make child-rearing decisions is said to be 
superior to anyone else’s rights. Parents have the right to direct their 
child’s education,133 remove their children from state schools, choose 
religious training for their children,134 impart parental moral values 
regardless of their conformity to larger societal values, medicate their 
child, determine the appropriate medical therapies for their child135 and 
at times withhold medical treatment from their child,136 put their child 
to paid or unpaid work at an appropriate age,137 discipline their child,138 
 
 132 See, e.g., KAREN WORTHINGTON, WHAT IS RIGHT FOR CHILDREN: THE COMPETING 
PARADIGMS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Martha A. Fineman & Karen Worthington 
eds., 2009). But see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1 (1995); LINDA C. MCCLAIN & 
DANIEL CERE, WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 41 
(Linda McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013).  
 133 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Act at 
issue unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the education of their 
children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the 14th Amendment 
protects the right of parents to engage with the teacher in educating their children). 
 134 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 135 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (“The fact that a child may balk at 
hospitalization or complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does 
not diminish the parents’ authority to decide what is best for the child.”). 
 136 In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
(explaining that in life threatening situations, the state does at times override parental 
authority over medical decisions). 
 137 E.g., Exemptions to the FLSA, DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/ 
youthlabor/exemptionsflsa (“Minors under age 16 working in a business solely owned 
or operated by their parents or by persons standing in place of their parents, can work 
any time of day and for any number of hours.”) (last visited July 8, 2019). 
 138 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (stating that parent’s use of 
force is not criminal if it is used to promote the child’s welfare and is not designed or 
  
2019] The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk 235 
institutionalize their child,139 decide and limit with whom their child 
may socialize and develop relationships,140 consent to the marriage of a 
child,141 and control their child’s use of time.142  
1. Rationales for Parental Prerogatives 
Though these parental decision-making rights have deep roots, there 
is not a clear consensus over the reasons for that delegation that 
operates consistently across contexts. In particular, it is not clear what 
weight the child’s welfare is to be given in that delegation as against the 
parent’s independent rights. At times the two are conflated, and at times 
the law sees a distinction between the two, despite their vast overlap. 
Both ideas can be seen informing the decision-making authority that 
parents are given. 
a. Parenting on Behalf of the Child 
From the child-welfare perspective, the parent is viewed as the one 
closest to the child, whose interests most align with those of the child, 
especially when compared with more detrimental actors such as the 
state.143 Giving parents decision-making authority works to strengthen 
the responsibility for care that operates hand in hand with the rights. 
On this view, parents act as fiduciaries, as proxies for the child’s own 
choice. I view this as a transitive relation principle: giving the benefit of 
rights to parents gives the true benefit to the child.  
There are many ways to say and explain this. According to the highly 
influential work of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, 
this is best expressed in the pure psychological form. Under that 
framing, children’s needs include the assurance of a single consistent 
authority:  
 
known to create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury or extreme pain or 
mental distress or gross degradation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2019).  
 139 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 584. 
 140 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
 141 See Fraidy Reiss, Despite Progress, Child Marriage Is Still Legal in All 50 States, 
N.Y. TIMES: ON THE GROUND (July 26, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://kristof.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2017/07/26/despite-progress-child-marriage-is-still-legal-in-all-50-states/. 
 142 See generally Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents 
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”). 
 143 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (“The child is not the mere 
creature of the state.”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 
VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). 
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To safeguard the right of parents to raise their children as they 
see fit, free of government intrusion, except in cases of neglect 
and abandonment, is to safeguard each child’s need for 
continuity.144  
In this particularly clear formulation of the transitive relation principle, 
there is no pretense that a parent’s decision-making authority rests on a 
peculiar skill or knowledge. Instead, it is self-justifying in terms of the 
child’s need for a singular and continuous authority figure.  
Sometimes parents are instead presumed to possess an alignment of 
interests due to both their love for the child and their knowledge of her 
unique attributes that make them peculiarly skilled at decision-making:  
The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that 
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and 
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult 
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that 
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests 
of their children.145  
b. Parenting as Self-determination 
Yet in contrast to child-centered decision-making, the decision-
making authority is sometimes described as a fundamental right of the 
parents for their own sake. In the words of Charles Fried: 
[T]he right to form one’s child’s values, one’s child’s life plan 
and the right to lavish attention on that child are extensions of 
the basic right not to be interfered with in doing these things 
for oneself.146  
Fried identifies an important thread in parental decision-making 
authority: “The liberty asserted by parents is not an aspect of self-
determination, but rather a liberty to determine someone else’s.”147 In 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the U.S. Supreme Court validated parents’ 
independent interests in child-rearing over assertions of the child’s own 
competing interest: 
[O]ur holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of 
the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the 
 
 144 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 7 (1973).  
 145 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
 146 CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 150-52 (1978). 
 147 Id. 
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parents. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for 
failing to cause their children to attend school, and it is their 
right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must 
determine Wisconsin’s power to impose criminal penalties on 
the parent . . . . [T]his case involves the fundamental interest of 
parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the 
religious future and education of their children.148 
This strand of decision-making can be restated from a child-welfare 
perspective, by indulging a fiction that what’s good for parents is good 
for children. But it’s difficult to ignore that a part of the legal authority 
given to parents includes rights for the parents’ benefit, because parents 
“are entitled to maintain their offspring and seek meaning with and 
through them.”149 Indeed, the Supreme Court cases that struggled with 
parental consent to terminate a pregnancy noted that parents might 
counsel a pregnant child toward the child’s best interest, or might have 
independent parental interests that statutes empowering a veto to 
abortion were designed to protect. That potential independent statutory 
interest troubles the Court, but only because the interests of the child 
in reproductive control enjoy a strong counterbalancing constitutional 
weight. So in Planned Parent v. Danforth,150 in striking down a provision 
that gave parents the right to veto a child’s decision to terminate a 
pregnancy, the court considered the nature of the interest in parental 
decision-making: 
One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the family unit and 
of parental authority . . . . It is difficult, however, to conclude 
that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule a 
determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to 
terminate the patient’s pregnancy will serve to strengthen the 
family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will 
enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the 
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the 
very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family 
structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the 
termination of the minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty 
 
 148 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972). 
 149 Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of 
the Family, 91 ETHICS 6, 17 (1980) (emphasis added).  
 150 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
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than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to 
have become pregnant.151 
The court explicitly recognizes the awkward reality that parents do 
make decisions to help their children, and they also make decisions for 
their own independent reasons. That the court gives more weight to the 
child’s interests in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, and more weight to 
the parents’ interests in Wisconsin v. Yoder, shouldn’t obscure the clarity 
with which the court is able to separate the two interests and identify a 
unique parental stake in childrearing that is not dependent on child 
welfare and the transitive principle.152 
Among the clearest, most troubling, and most controversial examples 
of parental authority that engages parents’ independent interests is the 
ability to consent on behalf of a child to marriage. Marriage is a 
monumentally significant decision, often legalizing sexual relations 
below an age of statutory consent, functionally authorizing teen 
reproduction, and fundamentally altering the life course of a minor 
child. Parental consent to marriage is considered necessary for minors 
because they lack capacity to make this decision themselves, and in 
most states parents are able to consent to the marriage of a minor child, 
often at very young ages.153 The typical case of under-aged marriage in 
the United States involves the pregnancy of a girl.154 It is difficult to 
tease out the parental motivations for responding to a child pregnancy 
by encouraging a child marriage. But a plausible explanation is that 
child pregnancy triggers the independent experience of shame in the 
parents. Those who do consent to the marriage of a minor girl 
sometimes cite avoiding embarrassment as one reason for the marriage, 
without distinguishing their own embarrassment from their 
daughter’s.155 Yet a child’s sense of shame is rarely independent of a 
 
 151 Id. (emphasis added). 
 152 See generally Martha Albertson Fineman & George B. Shepherd, Homeschooling: 
Choosing Parental Rights over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57 (2016).  
 153 See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 64 P.3d 1056 (Nev. 2003). 
 
154
 See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, 11 Years Old, a Mom, and Pushed to Marry Her Rapist in 
Florida, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/opinion/ 
sunday/it-was-forced-on-me-child-marriage-in-the-us.html [hereinafter 11 Years Old]; 
see also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301(b) (2019) (allowing marriage at 15-years-
old if “the woman to be married . . . is pregnant or has given birth to a child”); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-2.1(a) (2018) (allowing marriage at 14-years-old in cases of 
pregnancy); State Dep’t of Human Resources v. Lott, 16 So. 3d 104, 107-08 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2009) (explaining that pregnancy of a 13-year-old satisfies exception to minimum 
age restrictions, approving her marriage to a 19-year-old). 
 
155
 Nicholas Kristof, An American 13-Year-Old, Pregnant and Married to Her Rapist, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/opinion/sunday/ 
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parent’s, because children are too immature to evaluate what’s 
shameful. In the familiar effort to cover shame, courts and legislatures 
are not asking whose embarrassment is at stake, as the parental 
authority to make decisions in this realm is longstanding. But this 
practice is under increased scrutiny. In the words of Nicholas Kristof, 
“thousands of underage American girls . . . are married each year, often 
sacrificing their futures to reduce embarrassment to their parents.”156 
With respect to some types of decisions, parental authority is 
remarkably strong, but in the context of parental consent to child 
marriage, it has few defenders. 
While contemporary discussions seem to embrace the conclusion that 
it’s best to state the parent’s decision-making interest in child-centered 
terms, this is hardly a triumph over adult interests. For example, parents 
are able to consent to a blood, marrow, or organ donation by their child 
for the benefit of that child’s sibling or half-sibling, as long as the parent 
can say that the donation benefits the donor.157 Courts and other actors 
in the legal system, though, are satisfied with “psychological benefit” to 
the donor, and that is the routine formal explanation for deciding to 
authorize the living transplant.158 It is difficult to imagine, however, that 
in fact a parent is driven to consent to organ donation from her child to 
her other child by the benefits to the donor, rather than the benefits to 
the recipient child paired with an assessment that the harm to the donor 
is less than that benefit. We may state her parental decision-making in 
entirely child-centered terms, but we do not need to be blind to the role 
of rhetoric in casting the parental authority in that particular light, 
rather than acknowledging that we authorize parents to pursue their 
own needs and interests through their children. 
There are legal scenarios that put the divergence of child and parent 
interests into stark contrast, such as the parent who takes a child actor 
or athlete’s earnings for themselves.159 But most of the time it’s difficult 
 
child-marriage-delaware.html [hereinafter 13-Year-Old]; see Kristof, 11 Years Old, supra 
note 154 (discussing how parents may pressure their underage children into marriage). 
 156 Kristof, 13-Year-Old, supra note 155; see Kristof, 11 Years Old, supra note 154. 
 157 See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Curran v. Bosze, 
566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969); 
Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
 158 See cases cited supra note 157. 
 159 See generally Danielle Ayalon, Note, Minor Changes: Altering Current Coogan Law 
to Better Protect Children Working in Entertainment, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 351, 
353 (2013) (discussing the history and need for Coogan Laws that protect child 
entertainers from financial exploitation by parents, and the need to update those laws 
to strengthen protections and close loopholes); Jessica Krieg, Comment, There’s No 
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to make the distinction at play in this discussion between a parent 
acting on a child’s behalf and acting on her own behalf, not because 
some set of parents hide their self-interests so effectively, but because 
the identity of child and parent are so intertwined, and the nature of 
intention in this context so slippery, that the distinction doesn’t convey 
a meaningful or useable category much of the time. Still, legislative 
delegations of authority to parents, where they do become 
controversial, need to be vetted for possible divergence between the 
interests of a child and the interests of the parent. 
2. Established Limitations on Parental Decision-making with 
Rationales 
Parents make many decisions for their children, without a serious 
evaluation of the rationale (be it a child-centered transitive relation, or 
a parent’s prerogative), and whether the rationale is salient under the 
given circumstances. Yet a substantial amount of child-protective law is 
difficult to explain without the supposition that parents are not always 
an adequate safeguard of children’s welfare. This is not necessarily 
because parents are selfish and mean, but because they are embedded 
in social and economic conditions, and they cannot be an expert in 
everything.  
Consider laws that require us to put our children in rearward facing 
car seats in the back.160 If this is necessary to save my child’s life in an 
accident, why on earth would I need a legal requirement to do so? No 
parent wants to see their infant injured in a car accident, and one might 
think parents are ideally situated to render a car seat law superfluous. 
But something about parental decision-making is deemed faulty in that 
context. Perhaps it is that the risk of injury is too great, meaning the 
risk calculation weighs too heavily in one direction, or the risk balance 
requires an engineering expertise that cannot be adequately taught to 
parents in shorthand. But it may be that parents are systematically 
flawed for this decision. They may predictably underestimate the risk 
that this one trip will include an accident (optimism bias). Or the well-
intentioned temptation of parents to soothe a child’s immediate and 
sometimes urgently expressed need to be seen and heard and held can 
be expected to overcome the regulatory cost-benefit analysis of long-
 
Business Like Show Business: Child Entertainers and the Law, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
429, 432 (2004).  
 
160
 What Does Your State Law Say About Car Seats?, SAFE RIDE 4 KIDS, 
https://saferide4kids.com/car-seat-laws-by-state/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2019). 
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term risk underlying the car seat requirement. Slate Magazine reminds 
us that a screaming baby is a powerful motivator: 
Little — possibly no — research has been done on how much 
more difficult it is to drive a car safely with a child shrieking out 
the torments of the damned immediately behind the driver’s 
seat, but anecdotally I can say that it doesn’t actually help. 
Unless you’re really invested in car seat safety — which is to 
say, unless you understand the dangers and respect the 
recommendations and those who are making them — it’s 
tempting to let car seats slide (or turn them around) in the name 
of convenience and peace.161  
For the parent of the screaming baby who wants to pick the child up, 
or install the car seat facing forward so that the child can see the parent, 
we think a legal mandate that runs contrary to parental impulse is 
necessary to protect the child, and so we override the parent’s authority 
to make risk assessments.162 Parents are imperfect decision-makers even 
when compelled by a desire to help their child, and they may need more 
than information to make a “right” choice in that context. Parents may 
even appreciate being tied to the mast, so that they must resist their 
baby’s siren song. 
3. Limits on Parental Authority When That Authority Functionally 
Serves Third Parties 
The entire universe of articulated reasons for legal deference to 
parental decision-making authority, however, lies between the child’s 
benefit and the parent’s benefit. There is no visible legal theory 
supporting parental authority to benefit third party institutions, 
whether they are schools, employers, hospitals, or recreational 
organizations. What emerges if we organize limits on parental authority 
by the intended beneficiary of a parent’s consent? When the intended 
beneficiary is either the child or the parent, the law is situational in 
adjusting the limits of parental authority. But when the functional 
beneficiary appears to be a third party, the legal system should be more 
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 KJ Dell Antonia, Safe, Sound, and Screaming Her Head Off, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2011, 
1:26 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2011/03/safe-sound-and-screaming-her-
head-off.html. 
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 See, e.g., Lenore Skenazy, Thanks, New Jersey, For the Child Protection Laws That Are 
Driving Me CRAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS (May 13, 2015), http://www.freerangekids.com/ 
thanks-new-jersey-for-the-child-protection-laws-that-are-driving-me-crazy/ (mentioning 
that a group of parents engage in an interesting online discussion of whether car seat safety 
has gone too far in constraining their parental freedom).  
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skeptical of relying on parental authority, and ordinarily is more 
skeptical. 
For example, no parent tries to enforce a waiver of liability against a 
recreational operator. Only the recreational operator seeks enforcement 
of that parental waiver, and a majority of courts refuse to enforce 
parental waivers despite purported parental authority.163 Courts and 
legislatures should be, and arguably are, attentive to whether the 
concept of parental authority is exploited to achieve the transfer of risk 
from institutions to individuals more generally. 
Consider child labor laws, which responded to a widespread problem 
of children leaving school at young ages to toil in unsafe factory 
conditions dangerous to their health and to their educational 
development. Why on earth would a caring parent have allowed it? We 
recognize that it’s an unfair question: economic conditions demanded 
it, wage structures were developed in reliance on it, and as long as the 
choice to put a child in the workforce was available, it was also very 
difficult to avoid by even the most child-centered parent. The choice 
architecture, put your child to work or starve, hardly sets the stage for 
safe childhood, and few believed that parental consent to labor could 
operate adequately to protect children. In the context of child labor, 
parents are not inadequate because they are emotionally compelled to 
respond to urgent need, as with the car seat, but because they are 
embedded in the social and economic conditions of a race to the bottom. 
Their freedom to put their children to work may be replacing the better 
choice they wish they had. Child labor is understood to be benefitting 
the employer, not the child or the parent, and parental consent should 
not be deployed for that functional purpose. 
If, as others have argued, paternalism can increase rather than 
decrease real world options,164 child labor laws would be a good 
example. The paternalistic removal of an option from the table in the 
context of child labor laws added a different option that had not been 
 
 163 See infra Part V.B.  
 164 See, e.g., ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE 
GOVERNING POWER 541 (1952) (discussing how government, by its nature, involves 
some control of the freedom of individuals in order to provide liberty for all); Bruce 
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, 
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Duncan 
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 
(1982). A refusal to enforce a parental waiver or bend to parental consent is functionally 
the same as requiring by statute a warranty of habitability — both limit the hypothetical 
freedom to contract of the parties, but as a result, they enhance the sphere of 
entitlements, rights, or benefits of those with no practical bargaining power. 
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available before: remove your child from the workforce and earn an 
adequate wage yourself to cover family expenses. Each time we attempt 
to waive our child’s right to sue for personal injury so that the child can 
participate in a physical activity, we can be said to be choosing the 
activity over protection against negligence. What we’d really like is the 
option that is not on the table: participation in activities with protection 
from negligence. When we decide to let our children play youth football 
and waive the child’s right to sue for personal injury, including 
traumatic brain injury, we are not presented with the third option of 
youth football redesigned to reduce primary injury risk, which might 
be the most desirable option overall.  
Sometimes, we see a legal practice that may be said to operate by using 
parental authority for the benefit of outside actors or institutions. 
Where we do, third parties are exploiting parental authority for their 
own gain, expropriating its power without legitimately invoking its 
underlying justifications. I would argue we can highlight that function 
and cite it as a reason to question the legal allocation of parental 
authority. The Lystedt Laws, I argue, are such a legal practice.  
Parents do not enjoy absolute authority to do whatever they would 
like to their children for a range of reasons, from their own selfishness 
or aggression (consider child abuse laws), to their ignorance or 
cognitive failures (consider the ability to properly calculate the car seat 
risk for just this one trip), to their adaptive preference to the narrow 
choice set in front of them (e.g., the child works or the family starves), 
to their independent self-interests (e.g., a desire to become a 
grandparent when a child is pregnant or to resolve moral questions in 
favor of a parent’s morality), to the unjustified expropriation of their 
legal power by institutional actors.  
B. Parental Waiver of Liability 
To assess where parental decisions around concussion risk fit into the 
framework of parental decision-making more broadly, we need to 
examine the law around parental waiver of liability to a minor, because 
courts are skeptical of enforcing those parental releases and the Lystedt 
framework bears a strong resemblance to parental waiver. 
When adults sign a waiver releasing liability for negligence before 
their own participation in a risky recreational activity, the vast majority 
of states will enforce the waiver if it is well-written and the underlying 
activity is not essential.165 State law varies in the scrutiny given to these 
 
 165 Only three states refuse to enforce any pre-injury releases of liability for negligent 
injury to anyone. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
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agreements and conditions placed on the types of behavior that may be 
released and in what contexts, but enforceability is the general rule.  
But a parental waiver involves attempting to use parental authority to 
contractually bind a third party, the child, and so the freedom of 
contract concept of an agreement between the relevant parties to accept 
a risk is not so easily applied. To complicate the matter further, if the 
child herself signed the release, we would deny enforcement because 
she lacks the capacity to contract as a minor.166 That inability to contract 
arises out of both her immaturity and fears that immaturity will be 
exploited by a third party, and we may read parental authority as the 
proxy for that maturity. Yet making a decision for a child is one thing, 
making a decision as if you are that child is another. There is no meeting 
of the minds if judgment is substituted; in many contexts we engage a 
legal fiction about the substituted judgment of parents, but in this nitty 
gritty of contractual enforcement, courts do not think the parent can 
bind the child to the agreement.  
This means that we need to find the right to parental waiver of liability 
somewhere other than in “as if” substitution for the child. Substituted 
judgment may make more sense when a parent assumes a financial 
liability for a child, by co-signing a loan, but injury to body is not a 
transferrable interest. Rather, we need a justification anchored in the 
independent judgment of the parent, and that justification has not been 
easy for the courts to find. 
Parents might be forgiven for assuming parental waivers are 
important based on the amount of time they spend executing them, but 
they are not ordinarily enforceable. The majority of courts that have 
considered the issue have refused to enforce a parent’s pre-injury waiver 
of a child’s negligence claim.167 The law is not universal. In 1990, 
 
1-702 (2019); see also Johnson’s Adm’x v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 86 Va. 975, 978 
(1890). Several other states enforce agreements in theory but apply exceptionally high 
standards to the conditions and types of businesses that may successfully use waivers 
that they might be characterized as almost prohibiting enforcement altogether. See, e.g., 
Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 738 (Conn. 2005); Dalury v. S-K-I, 
Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 797-98 (Vt. 1995). 
 166 See TIMOTHY MURRAY, 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 27.2 (2019). 
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California became the first state to enforce a parent’s pre-injury waiver 
of liability,168 and since then several other state courts have followed 
suit. In addition, a few state legislatures have overturned state court 
decisions refusing to enforce waivers, most notably Colorado.169 On 
some counts, since that 1990 California decision, up to a dozen states 
have allowed enforcement of parental releases under some 
circumstances. But this seriously overstates the norm, as most of these 
changes were created by statute, and some are explicitly limited to a 
single activity. For example, risk only from equine activities may be 
released in six states by statute, and only from motorsport activities in 
two states.170 A few states put such conditions on the release that its 
enforceability is theoretical only. The Florida legislature, for example, 
passed a statute that appeared to allow for enforcement of parental 
waivers only by nonprofit operators, but not commercial entities, but 
that in effect refuses enforcement of all negligence waivers; the statute 
limits commercial releases to injury resulting from inherent risks of the 
activity, expressly excluding injuries that arise from negligence, and 
reverts nonprofit waivers to the common law, which had already 
refused to enforce them.171 Since there shouldn’t be liability for injuries 
 
1979); Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 2010); Khoury v. Saik, 33 So. 
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High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC, 523 S.W.3d 624, 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017); 
Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245, 247 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Munoz v. II Jaz Inc., 863 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex. App. 1993); 
Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001); Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 
834 P.2d 6, 10 (Wash. 1992). 
 168 See Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649-50 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
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without negligence in any case, the Florida legislature has made no 
meaningful concession to tort defendants. 
Reasons for refusal to enforce these parental waivers are instructive 
as we consider their relevance to the Lystedt structure. I would 
characterize one set of objections to these releases as grounded in safety 
incentives, a concern that influences non-enforcement of releases for 
adults as well: if recreational operators can be released from their own 
negligence, they will lack incentives toward safe operation, and for some 
types of accidents, they are the cheapest or only cost-avoider.172 They 
may, for example, control completely the premises and the conduct of 
the activity, akin to the rules of play in sports. Therefore, removing the 
incentive to safety imposed by tort law from the outfitter and placing it 
on the participant functionally reduces safety. 
But other types of arguments for not enforcing parental waivers of 
liability are grounded in the parent-child relationship and the difficulty 
of a person consenting to risk on behalf of another person, and thereby 
binding that person to a contract to suffer the losses as an individual. 
The parent-child relationship, and the extensive authority granted to 
parents in family law, do not extend to this risk contract. 
1. Children’s Legal Affairs 
Common law courts continue to scrutinize parental management of 
children’s legal affairs in an explicit effort to police the risk of parental 
mismanagement. For example, generally, parents lack the authority to 
waive a legal right to child support on behalf of their children without 
judicial approval. In the pre-injury waiver context, some courts reason 
that waivers cannot be enforced because of the limited authority of 
parents over their children’s legal affairs, referencing the independent 
legal protection for children from parental decisions.173 With respect to 
personal injury, adults may settle their own post-injury tort claims and 
waive liability without court approval, but if a parent seeks to settle a 
claim for injury to her child, that settlement must be approved by a 
 
 172 See, e.g., Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 744-45 (Conn. 2005). 
 173 See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 2010); see also 39 AM. 
JUR. 2D Guardian & Ward § 115 (2019); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 40 (2019). 
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court.174 This has been a longstanding and relatively explicit limitation 
on the legal authority of parents.175 
A version of the rationale grounded in established limits on authority 
in contractual contexts notices that the parental signature may function 
on behalf of the party in opposition to the child, and inappropriately 
use the child’s interests in that process. On this reasoning, parental 
authority to waive liability would not be in the child’s interest, and the 
parent has no right to strike a legal bargain for that actor’s benefit at the 
expense of her child: 
[W]hen a parent decides to execute a pre-injury release on 
behalf of a minor child, the parent is not protecting the welfare 
of the child, but is instead protecting the interests of the activity 
provider.176 
The possibility that a third party is deploying parental authority or 
parental autonomy — and will always be the party doing so in court 
under the contractual structure of a parental waiver of liability — 
appears to be adequate justification for refusal to enforce it.177 
2. Comparing Pre- and Post-injury Releases 
For many courts, the baseline then is whether there is a difference 
between pre- and post-injury releases that would justify different 
treatment. Courts who use the post-injury release as a baseline of 
comparison often find it difficult to explain why a pre-injury release 
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 175 See 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND CHILD § 41 (2019). 
 176 Kirton, 997 So. 2d at 357. 
 177 See id. 
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should be enforceable when a post-injury release is not. The Utah 
court’s reasoning on this issue is fairly typical: 
[W]e see little reason to base the validity of a parent’s 
contractual release of a minor’s claim on the timing of an injury. 
Indeed, the law generally treats preinjury releases or indemnity 
provisions with greater suspicion than postinjury releases. An 
exculpatory clause that relieves a party from future liability may 
remove an important incentive to act with reasonable care. 
These clauses are also routinely imposed in a unilateral manner 
without any genuine bargaining or opportunity to pay a fee for 
insurance. The party demanding adherence to an exculpatory 
clause simply evades the necessity of liability coverage and then 
shifts the full burden of risk of harm to the other party. 
Compromise of an existing claim, however, relates to 
negligence that has already taken place and is subject to 
measurable damages. Such releases involve actual negotiations 
concerning ascertained rights and liabilities. Thus, if anything, 
the policies relating to restrictions on a parent’s right to 
compromise an existing claim apply with even greater force in 
the preinjury, exculpatory clause scenario.178  
The Utah court blends substantive reasons for denying enforcement of 
waivers altogether, such as dis-incentivizing safety, with a head-to-head 
comparison of the different bargaining environments pre- and post-
injury.179 Yet the underlying principle that both agreements test the 
ability of parents to extinguish legal claims remains for courts in most 
states. 
3. Lack of Alignment Between Parent and Child Interests 
Some courts that reject enforcement of parental waivers reason 
simply that we shouldn’t assume parental interests are aligned with their 
children’s, because it “cannot be presumed that a parent who has 
decided to voluntarily risk a minor child’s physical well-being is acting 
in the child’s best interest.”180 This framing seems to anticipate an actual 
 
 178 Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066 (Utah 2001) (citation omitted). 
 179 Admittedly, post-injury settlements require judicial scrutiny in part for fear that 
parental interest in money will override their interest in child welfare, and the pre-injury 
context is different because there is no concrete monetary figure evidently at stake in 
the moment of agreement. 
 180 Kirton, 997 So.2d at 357. 
  
2019] The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk 249 
split of interests between parent and child. One New York court put the 
question of divergence of parental and child interests this way: 
[W]e are extremely wary of a transaction that puts parent and 
child at cross-purposes and, in the main, normally tends to 
quiet the legitimate complaint of the minor child.181 
4. Parental Incompetence 
A more measured version of this kind of blunt assessment on the 
merits is reflected in the reasoning of a number of the courts that have 
rejected enforcement not because parents are self-interested, but 
because their sometimes poor judgment cannot come at the expense of 
the child. Acknowledging that a parent can make a bad decision on 
behalf of a child, who would be unjustifiably harmed as a result, one 
court posited, “children still must be protected against parental actions 
— perhaps rash and imprudent ones — that foreclose all of the minor’s 
potential claims for injuries caused by another’s negligence.”182 
These opinions expressly contemplate the possibility of well-
intentioned but poor parental judgment in signing waivers, and assert 
the authority to override that judgment on behalf of the minor child:  
These limitations on parents’ authority to make legally 
enforceable transactions affecting the property and financial 
interests of their minor children are derived from a well-
established public policy that children must be accorded a 
measure of protection against improvident decisions of their 
parents.183 
Three courts that have allowed enforcement of parental waivers have 
done so on the theory that respect for fundamental parental rights and 
authority compel respecting a parent’s decision to waive her child’s 
ability to sue for negligence before it has occurred. These courts deploy 
parental rights language on behalf of the commercial actors with whom 
the parents contracted.184 The Colorado legislature overturned a state 
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court opinion holding parental waivers were unenforceable,185 and the 
statutory text uses the same parental rights language:  
(IV) Parents make conscious choices every day on behalf of 
their children concerning the risks and benefits of participation 
in activities that may involve risk; 
(V) These are proper parental choices on behalf of children 
that should not be ignored. So long as the decision is voluntary 
and informed, the decision should be given the same dignity as 
decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious 
education.186 
While the Colorado legislature and a few courts do use the elevated 
parental rights language, most courts that will enforce parental waiver 
do not premise enforcement on parental rights, but rather on the 
practical regulatory burden of tort law. 
5. Concern About Reducing Access to Recreational Opportunities 
By far the most common reason cited in the literature and in cases for 
allowing enforcement of these agreements is not fundamental parental 
rights, but practical incentives.187 The few courts that do enforce 
parental waivers reason that without them, recreational opportunities 
will be eliminated or diminished. It appears not only in the cases, but 
in discussion of releases among lawyers and in the business community. 
An Ohio court, in choosing to enforce a parental waiver, makes the 
argument clearly: 
Therefore, we conclude that although Bryan, like many children 
before him, gave up his right to sue for the negligent acts of 
others, the public as a whole received the benefit of these 
exculpatory agreements. Because of this agreement, the Club was 
able to offer affordable recreation and to continue to do so without 
the risks and overwhelming costs of litigation. Bryan’s parents 
agreed to shoulder the risk. Public policy does not forbid such 
an agreement. In fact, public policy supports it. Accordingly, we 
believe that public policy justifies giving parents authority to 
enter into these types of binding agreements on behalf of their 
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minor children. We also believe that the enforcement of these 
agreements may well promote more active involvement by 
participants and their families, which, in turn, promotes the 
overall quality and safety of these activities.188 
The court views the risk transfer as being from the Club to Bryan’s 
parents, rather than to Bryan himself, treating the substituted judgment 
as equivalent to substituted pain. This claim from regulatory over-
burden is on the one hand intuitive to any lawyer arguing from basic 
incentives, and yet intuitively inaccurate to any non-lawyer parent who 
sees a proliferation of recreational activities for youth in those majority 
of states that refuse to enforce waivers. This potentially important 
argument for enforcing agreements loses force if recreational 
opportunities remain robust and wide-ranging in states that do not 
enforce parental waivers. It’s difficult to detect the marginal increase in 
opportunities that the theory hypothesizes. 
I could not find any empirical study of the question of whether there 
was in fact any difference in recreational opportunities between states 
that do and do not enforce these agreements. Given that most states do 
enforce them for adults and don’t enforce them for children, we might 
expect to see most states having a substantial number of recreational 
outfits that have limited their operations to adults capable of signing an 
effective waiver of liability. I could find one activity, sky-diving, that 
tends to be limited to adults, but this is regardless of state. The 
governing safety rating association for the industry has determined that 
it is unsafe to jump under the age of eighteen, and will not license 
instructors who would teach a minor,189 so it doesn’t seem appropriate 
to attribute that age restriction to the state of waiver law without more 
evidence. 
While direct study of the question is unavailable, indirect evidence 
does not appear to support the concern. There is no detectable pattern 
of recreational, athletic, or wilderness opportunity disparity between 
states that do and do not enforce parental waivers, and all states that do 
not enforce them appear to have a wide array of these opportunities.190 
 
 188 Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 
189
 See U.S. PARACHUTE ASS’N, SKYDIVER’S INFORMATION MANUAL 5 (2018), 
https://uspa.org/Portals/0/files/Man_SIM.pdf. 
 190 In two states that do not enforce either parental or adult waivers, Montana and 
Louisiana, we find that they do not have the lowest high school athletic participation rates. 
The national average of high school athletic participation is 60%. In comparison, in Louisiana 
55% of high school students participated in athletics, and Montana 76%. Compare Table 
203.30. Public School Enrollment in Grades 9 Through 12, by Region, State, and Jurisdiction: 
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Additionally, non-enforcement states do not appear to have lower youth 
athletic opportunities than comparable states that have not declared 
their unwillingness to enforce waivers.191 Finally, there does not seem 
to be a decrease in outdoor reactional activities in states that do not 
enforce adult waivers.192 The circumstantial evidence tends to 
 
Selected Years, Fall 1990 through fall 2028, NAT’L CTR. EDU. STATS., 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d18/tables/dt18_203.30.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) 
(containing the number of high school students per state in 2015-16) with 2016-17 High 
School Athletics Participation Survey, NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N, 
http://www.nfhs.org/ParticipationStatistics/PDF/201617_Participation_Survey_Results.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (listing the 2016-17 high school athletic participation rate, 
including individuals who participated in two sports counted twice, three sports counted 
three times, etc.).  
 191 For example, when comparing USA Football Leagues per state, Montana, which 
does not enforce waivers, has fifty-nine USA Football affiliated leagues; Idaho, a 
comparable state that has taken no position on parental waivers, has fifty leagues; 
Louisiana has ninety-six leagues and does not enforce parental waivers; Virginia has 
179 and does not enforce parental waivers; while Delaware, which leans toward 
enforcing waivers, has thirty. Find a Heads Up League, USA FOOTBALL, 
https://usafootball.com/resources-tools/heads-up-football-finder/ (last visited July 9, 
2019). Adjusting these figures for variation in population size doesn’t produce a more 
conclusive pattern. For example, Idaho has a larger population than Montana, and a 
theoretically friendlier legal climate on parental waivers, but has fewer football 
opportunities either absolutely or per capita. The Delaware and Virginia comparisons 
are about equal proportionally to the population differences. The number of leagues 
isn’t a direct product of the number of players, but it’s the most reliable figure available 
to capture any feared reduction in opportunity. Similarly, there do not appear to be 
fewer youth soccer opportunities in declared non-enforcing states. In Montana, where 
waivers are not enforced, there are thirty-five youth soccer leagues affiliated with the 
state’s soccer association and in Idaho, which is undeclared on parental waivers, there 
are twelve. In Virginia, where there is no enforcement, there are 116, and in Delaware, 
which leans toward waiver enforcement, there are thirteen, a ratio directly proportional 
to their population differences. See Hong v. Hockessin Athletic Club, No. N12C-05-004 
PLA, 2012 WL 2948186, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 18, 2012) (enforcing a waiver). In 
Louisiana, there are forty-two and in Mississippi there are fifty-one, though parental 
waivers are not enforced in either. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (1985); Burt v. Burt, 
841 So. 2d 108, 115 (Miss. 2001) (McRae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Khoury v. Saik, 33 So. 2d 616, 618 (Miss. 1948)). 
 192 For example, in 2017, 81% of Montana residents and 70% of Minnesota residents 
participated in outdoor recreational activities. Montana, OUTDOOR RECREATION ECON. 
REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017; Minnesota, OUTDOOR 
RECREATION ECON. REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017. However, 
unlike Montana, Minnesota does enforce adult liability waivers. See MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 604.055 (2019). Similarly, 57% of Virginia residents and 52% of New York residents 
participated in outdoor recreational activities. Virginia, OUTDOOR RECREATION ECON. 
REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017; New York, OUTDOOR RECREATION 
ECON. REP. (Outdoor Indus. Ass’n, Boulder, Colo.), July 2017. Virginia and New York 
are similar states and they have comparable percentages; however, New York enforces 
liability waivers and Virginia does not. See Lago v. Krollage, 575 N.E.2d 107, 110 (N.Y. 
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undermine the claim that youth opportunities to participate in athletic 
leagues will decline in states that have held that they will not enforce 
parental liability waivers.193  
A sample of information yields no evidence that the enforceability of 
pre-injury waivers impacts overall recreational opportunities. Looking 
at the number of youth athletic leagues and participation and looking 
at overall outdoor recreational participation surfaced no evidence that 
residents of states that do not enforce liability waivers have a decreased 
opportunity to participate in recreational activities. 
We use the term canard to indicate that an idea is both popular and 
unfounded. There’s a sound economic theory that would indicate that 
we need parental waivers to be enforced in order to ensure that we have 
adequate, or optimal, levels of recreational opportunity. Lack of 
evidence that the widespread failure to enforce parental waivers is 
having such an effect undermines the intuitive economic claim. As the 
Supreme Court of Iowa said in 2010: 
We believe the fear of dire consequences from our adoption of 
the majority rule is speculative and overstated. We find no 
reason to believe opportunities for recreational, cultural, and 
educational activities for youths have been significantly 
compromised in the many jurisdictions following the majority 
rule. In the final analysis, we conclude the strong public policy 
favoring the protection of children’s legal rights must prevail 
over speculative fears about their continuing access to 
activities.194 
If parental consent to waive liability for injury to a child cannot be 
explained by efforts to produce a more optimal level of recreational 
activities, the argument against enforcement, given the problem of 
substituted judgment, is greatly strengthened. Though some courts 
have moved toward enforcement of parental liability waivers, the 
majority continue to see little benefit to revising the common law rule 
against giving parents that authority. 
 
1991). Also, Montana is the state with the second highest proportion of recreational 
workers in the country, yet does not enforce liability waivers for either adults or 
children participating in recreational activities. Occupational Employment and Wages, 
May 2018, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/oes/ 
current/oes399032.htm. 
 193 This is an anecdotal tour of opportunities for recreational activity and the 
underlying state law of waivers; it is not a study. 
 194 Galloway v. State, 790 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Iowa 2010). 
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Indeed, the failure to enforce waivers is a paternalism that enhances 
functional choice of parents even as it impairs theoretical choice. As 
between amusement rides with a waiver of negligence claims and no 
amusement rides at all, parents seem to choose the amusement ride time 
and again. But the choice they’d prefer is the amusement ride without a 
waiver of the protections of negligence law, and the formal choice 
limitation is functionally choice-enhancing in just the way child labor 
laws and warranties of habitability are. That is the state of law 
surrounding parental waivers of liability. 
C. Parallels Between Waivers and Lystedt 
If parents lack the capacity to waive liability before a child can 
participate in a recreational activity, what is the premise of the Lystedt 
framework, and is it consistent with waiver law? In Part III.D, I argued 
that Lystedt is a worst-of-both-worlds hybrid between a waiver and a 
first aid/prevention provision. 
On one reading of waiver law, parents lack the capacity to make a 
decision for their child because their judgment isn’t adequately 
protective in that risk balancing context. Lystedt requires that risk 
information be conveyed to parents, which would improve their 
decision-making. At the same time, it’s already a staple of waiver law 
that waivers need to convey detailed risk information. Lystedt’s 
information component isn’t an improvement over the kinds of 
information conveyed in a well-drafted waiver form. 
In other ways, the Lystedt structure compares unfavorably to parental 
waivers of liability in terms of ensuring a good decision-making 
structure and adequate protection of child welfare. First, parents do not, 
under the Lystedt structure, actually sign a waiver of liability. They 
ordinarily sign an independent waiver of liability for all sports injuries, 
one that is ordinarily not enforceable but may nonetheless influence a 
parent’s litigation behavior. But the information provided with Lystedt 
doesn’t flag for the parent that the parent and child are assuming the 
risks enumerated, the way a waiver does. This is particularly 
problematic because so many states include immunity from tort in their 
Lystedt statutes so long as coaches follow return to play rules, so that 
participation itself triggers an actual waiver of liability. Yet there is no 
moment when the parent recognizes that statutory immunity has been 
granted. More important, Lystedt information does not explicitly invite 
a parent to decline participation altogether, even though implicitly 
every parent must realize that withdrawing is an option. Instead, 
Lystedt is focused on what to do after a concussion occurs, which has 
  
2019] The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk 255 
the potential to lead parents to believe that second-impact syndrome is 
the primary threat to their children’s welfare. 
This does not prove that there is something nefarious behind the 
Lystedt legislation. Rather, it is to say that taken together, the structure 
of the information and the decision-making prompts are inferior to the 
typical waiver of liability. Given that courts tend to assess parental 
waivers of liability with great skepticism, Lystedt represents a 
noteworthy departure from the typically circumscribed parental role in 
this setting. That it is achieved legislatively, as an intervention on 
common law decision-making, means that the immunity from tort 
extended here functions as an exception to the general ability of parents 
to sue for negligently caused sports-related injuries to their children. 
Is something else afoot with the Lystedt legislation? Legal and 
cultural commentary around the concussion issues is infused with 
deference: where the issue becomes knotty, defer to the parents. 
Consent becomes a remedy for the cultural tensions around sports and 
threats to children’s health. That Lystedt delivers a tort immunity to 
athletic organizations without notifying families that it has done so 
raises questions about who the legislation is designed to protect, and 
how parents are utilized in that process. 
V. CONSENT AND THE YOUTH SPORTS PARENT 
Many NFL and college football viewers feel conflicted about the 
concussion situation in football today. The New York Times Magazine 
asked the concussion-driven question on many viewers’ minds in an 
essay entitled, “Is It Immoral to Watch the Super Bowl?”195 Viewers 
appreciate a pathway “out” from the destruction/entertainment 
conundrum — a narrative that absolves the viewer of implication in 
harm to the players. That “out” might be somewhere between a 
psychological convenience and a psychological imperative for the 
viewer. It can be located in the consent of the players themselves. 
Without belief in player consent to their own destruction, the 
immorality of football feels inescapable.  
The significance of player consent to the industry’s 
destruction/entertainment conundrum becomes visible in the 
concussion litigation by former NFL players against the league and in 
 
 195 See Steve Almond, Is It Immoral to Watch the Super Bowl?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/magazine/is-it-immoral-to-watch-the-super-
bowl.html. 
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the widely discussed book and documentary “League of Denial.”196 Both 
League of Denial and the NFL concussion litigation focus on NFL 
conduct in concealing the true risk of concussion from players even 
when league officials either knew or should have known that the risk 
was greater than they were conveying. The NFL efforts to minimize the 
risk are explicitly likened to the efforts of the tobacco industry to hide 
the risks of their products from their consumers. 
On this framing, the NFL’s misconduct is not in exposing players to a 
one in three risk of brain damage, or a 90% risk of headaches, but in 
exposing them to that risk without their informed consent. The NFL 
concussion settlement only covers retired players, who claimed that the 
NFL concealed information that is now widely available to current 
players who presumably consent to risk in the face of more widespread 
information.197 In keeping with this theory of the wrong, the NFL 
changed course in its messaging, from directly denying the harm to its 
players prior to 2009, to investing in concussion research, changing 
game rules and return to play protocol, and generally endeavoring to 
stay in front of the issue for current players. The NFL’s new position is 
to gather and share as much information as possible with players and 
the public, shoring up the quality of player consent with better 
information. Implicitly, viewers are invited to resolve the 
destruction/entertainment conundrum the same way: today’s NFL 
players are more aware of what they are risking, and have chosen to play 
for money and the glory of the game; it would be raw paternalism for 
the viewer to second-guess that choice. The conundrum is resolved by 
libertarianism, deployed to reduce viewer responsibility for football’s 
harms. While football is the epicenter of this narrative, it can arise in 
other spectator sports, as was apparent during the World Cup in the 
 
 196 MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL (2013); LEAGUE OF 
DENIAL: THE NFL’S CONCUSSION CRISIS (Frontline 2013). 
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 Claims in NFL Concussion Settlement Hit $500 Million In Less Than 2 Years, CBS 
NEWS (July 30, 2018, 7:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nfl-concussion-claims-
hit-500-million-less-than-2-years/; Patrick Hruby, The NFL Dodges on Brain Injuries, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/09/ 
the-nfls-concussion-settlement-not-acceptable/379557/. 
  
2019] The Legal Design for Parenting Concussion Risk 257 
summer of 2014,198 and reflected in the much smaller National Hockey 
League settlement with a class of retired players in 2018.199 
The NFL’s framework of informed consent and assumption of risk are 
not unique to professional athletes. They are a blueprint for 
understanding the response to youth concussion as well. The current 
structure of intervention in youth sports seems to translate those same 
cultural ideas around consent to youth sports. 
A. Who Is the Youth Sports Parent? 
Popular characterization of sports parents tell us that they are 
competitive, aggressive, and care way too much about their child’s 
placement on the most competitive team and then about seeing that 
team win.200 The problem of the youth sports parent is well-ensconced 
in the discourse and practice of youth sports. Media reporting, pleas 
from coaches on sports blogs, and formal parental codes of conduct all 
reflect a sense that there is an issue to be addressed. Unpacking the 
cliché and examining what we do know about the sports parent 
phenomenon may help us to evaluate whether there is anything 
distinctive about parents in the sports context that would influence 
their role in the Lystedt structure. 
Research suggests a divide between child athletes and their parents 
with respect to the value of youth sports, with the children less focused 
on competition, winning, and status, and more focused on fun, while 
parents are focused on seeking the most competitive environment the 
child can attain. Scholars are digging into what children say about the 
attributes of fun, and competition and winning are very far down their 
list.201 Much has been made in recent years of a study finding that 70% 
of youth athletes have quit their sport by age thirteen, 202 citing lack of 
fun as the main driver of their decisions. Studies suggest children 
experience unwanted pressure to play and to perform as athletes from 
 
 198 See Marissa Payne, Brazilian Soccer Star Bellini Has CTE Diagnosed, Just as FIFA 
Revamps Concussion Protocol, WASH. POST. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www. 
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in Minnesota, INS. J. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
midwest/2018/11/13/507374.htm. 
 200 Rosenwald, supra note 18.  
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coaches, parents, and teammates that contributes to their exit from the 
field.203 Parental behavior impacts children’s sports experience, often 
negatively.204 Public health officials are concerned about the subsequent 
lack of physical activity by those who exit organized sports, and the 
negative health consequences for the child.205 In this light, research on 
the role parental pressure plays in a child’s enjoyment of the sport 
becomes highly relevant, because the child’s enjoyment is the key 
determinant of her continued participation. 
A central lament among researchers is that children now begin 
competitive sports at too young an age and specialize too quickly,206 in 
a marked shift from a generation ago.207 This specialization, in turn, is 
tied to a significant increase in injuries, particularly orthopedic injuries 
from repetitive overuse.208 Because this increased specialization is now 
infused throughout the youth sports culture, isolating the causal 
determinants is difficult. In an effort to understand the movement 
toward specialization, researchers have focused on parental decision-
making, and found that parents are a key determinant in the decision to 
specialize in a single sport at an early age.209 
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 204 Diana Amado et al., Incidence of Parental Support and Pressure on Their Children’s 
Motivational Processes Towards Sport Practice Regarding Gender, PLOS ONE 10, June 
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One often-cited explanation for parental over-investment in sports is 
a misperception that their child will be eligible for financial aid as a 
collegiate athlete if the appropriate levels of play are achieved in 
childhood.210 On this theory of parental misbehavior, parents simply 
make a factual miscalculation about their child’s likelihood of success, 
which leads to a decision equation with bad data inputs, or optimism 
bias.211 Parents compound the problem by overspending on youth 
athletic programs in the belief that it’s a sound financial investment.212 
Several studies show a concerning prevalence of parents spending on 
youth sports in place of saving for higher education,213 and sometimes 
raiding their own retirement funds to do so.214 That spending, in turn, 
places pressure on the child, which is linked to burnout and withdrawal 
from sports.215  
Parents drive their children to excel in other arenas as well — music 
and academics, for example. For each, we might evaluate whether 
parents accurately judge the costs and benefits of the child’s investment 
level, and even judge the academic investment as offering a higher 
payoff than the athletic investment. This all assumes, though, that the 
parent is acting on behalf of the child, calculating properly, or 
improperly. 
B. Sports Parent Emotions: My Little Gladiator 
Is there something beyond future-oriented optimism bias that may 
explain parental over-investment in youth sports — something specific 
to that context? Anecdotally and from media accounts, parents seem to 
bring more emotion to their children’s sporting events than can easily 
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be explained by their investment in collegiate scholarships. After all, 
researchers have found that some parents’ investment in their children’s 
sports causes them to curtail their own work hours,216 or to choose 
employment based on a work schedule suitable to facilitating a child’s 
athletics.217 It’s difficult to imagine the ledger sheet that justifies this 
decision without some independent hedonic benefit to the parent. It 
seems plausible that sports parents would readily admit to independent 
enjoyment of their child’s participation in sports. 
In September of 2018, a brawl broke out among parents who were 
supposed to be shaking hands after a peewee football game in Wise, 
Virginia.218 Parents got into a physical altercation at a fourth grade 
basketball game in Oklahoma.219 Several adults were injured fighting at 
a basketball game among seven-year-olds in Ohio.220 A father whose two 
children were on the team that lost a championship basketball game in 
Massachusetts responded by biting the ear off of the opposing coach.221 
It seems that every weekend, a similar story appears in the news, though 
maybe none as notorious as Thomas Junta, who beat a parent to death 
after a hockey game in which the two men’s kids played on opposing 
teams.222 The National Association of Sports Officials reports that 70% 
of new referees quit within three years, and their survey shows that the 
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main reason is “pervasive abuse from parents and coaches.”223 Eighteen 
states have passed specific laws against assaulting a sports official.224 
Most parents are able to contain these emotions so that they do not 
spill over into violent action. But what exactly are these emotions? A 
library of recent coaching and self-help books and articles direct parents 
to get outside of their own heads and focused on their child’s 
wellness.225 Studies confirm what every parent can observe in other 
parents, that “parents have incongruent views to those of their children 
with regard to behaviors perceived as exerting pressure and support.”226 
The phenomenon is familiar to researchers concerned about 
determinants of child enjoyment in sports participation,227 and begs 
consideration of the mindset parents bring to risk decision-making. 
Research into children’s perceptions of their parents at sporting 
events places them into three categories: supportive parent, demanding 
coach, and crazed fan.228 The first category is appreciated by children, 
the last two are not,229 and the last two align with popular 
representations of overbearing sports parents. Indeed, recent research 
confirms what any sideline observer can see: parents are highly 
emotional about their children’s sporting events. 
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“Sports-related spectator aggression dates back to the crowds 
witnessing the gladiators at the Roman Coliseum and spans to present
day soccer hooliganism.”230 Using a model developed to assess other 
irrational phenomenon like road rage, a recent study surveying 425 
parents after watching their child’s youth soccer game identified a 
parallel phenomenon called “sideline rage.” The study found that 52.9% 
of sports parents reported being triggered to anger watching their child 
participate in organized athletics.231 The authors identify “ego 
defensiveness” as a prime culprit in parents’ sideline behaviors, meaning 
that parents have too much of themselves at stake in their children’s 
sports. A different researcher explains: 
[T]he achievements of children in an activity as visible and 
highly publicized as sports come to symbolize proof of one’s 
moral worth as a parent. Talented child athletes, therefore, 
become valuable moral capital in neighbourhoods, 
communities, and the subcultures associated with high-
performance youth sport programmes.232 
That is to say, sports may be wonderful for children, but they are 
independently meaningful to parents. 
A recent headline in the New York Times, “Why Sports Parents 
Sometimes Behave So Badly,”233 references this widely understood 
phenomenon — that parents can be irrational about their children’s 
sports. The Times cites a New Mexico parental code of conduct that 
contains language that many sports parents across the country will 
recognize, asking parents to agree that “I will be in control of my 
emotions” and “I will remember that the game is for our youth — not 
adults.” In no other arena are parents asked to sign codes of conduct 
that remind them of this obvious child-centered framework, because no 
other arena struggles under the systemic failure of parents to feel and 
behave as though this were the case. Yet it is that same parent, the one 
who needs explicit reminders to control his emotions and to consider 
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his child’s interest in the game, who legitimizes a child’s exposure to 
concussion risk under the Lystedt legislation. 
C. Reevaluating the Parent and Consent in the Lystedt Structure 
We’ve already established that there are substantial limits to a parent’s 
ability to make decision about health risk on behalf of a child, 
depending on the context. Given the structure of Lystedt, the form of 
concussion risk, the law of parental waivers, and the unique 
characteristics of the sports parent, we can address more directly the 
potential functioning of parents as risk decision-makers in the sports 
concussion context. I contend that in this context, the parental role 
under Lystedt rests on flawed premises about parental decision-making. 
1. The Problem of Sports Parents: Leagues Like Parents at Arm’s 
Length 
One mundane issue raised by the sports parent stereotype is that 
leagues and coaches work to build clear boundaries around parents. The 
constant small scale negotiation of those boundaries leaves many 
parents in fear of being trouble-makers, or wanting to save their capital 
for the most strategic interventions with coaches. Conversely, these 
issues leave coaches wary of parent communications. The Lystedt 
structure offers parents substantial information about what is often a 
vague and inconclusive initial diagnosis of concussion. But it theorizes 
that parents will be effective intermediaries between coach and child in 
much the way parents can serve this role with classroom teachers. Prior 
to a concussion, the underlying dynamic of the coach-parent 
relationship is that parents want their child to receive playtime. The 
post-hit shift, then is dramatic: parents ostensibly want the child not to 
play for the child’s safety, but they communicate this concern against 
the backdrop of wanting their child to remain in good standing with the 
coach and to be a team player — and as described above, often wanting 
the latter too much. This already carefully bounded relationship 
between parent and coach, complete with rulebooks and codes of 
conduct, makes it more difficult or risky for parents to act on concerns 
about their child’s post game headache or sleepiness. 
2. Lystedt’s Second Hit Structure Depends on Hedonic Reporting 
by the Child of Subtle Symptoms that Are Easily Misattributed 
The educational information provided to parents about the symptoms 
of a concussion may be accurate, but unfortunately, the symptoms of 
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concussion are uniquely susceptible to misunderstanding. In turn, the 
possibility of importing wishful thinking and cultural influence into the 
diagnosis as a lay person is quite high precisely because of the subtle 
and qualitative measures of concussion. Against that already complex 
backdrop, the parent is not characterizing her own symptoms, but that 
of her child. The parent must synthesize the child’s verbal complaints 
and the parent’s observation of the child’s behaviors. 
In the moments following a concussion, a child may have very 
obvious symptoms, including unconsciousness, inability to pass a basic 
mental status exam by identifying the date, year, or location, blindness, 
dizziness that makes it difficult to walk, or inability to follow a simple 
instruction.234 These are relatively clear, though often the parent is not 
present to witness them. 
A child may have these symptoms, but more often will not. It is 
possible to have a concussion and not know it.235 Some symptoms may 
not emerge for days or weeks following a hit,236 and concussions are 
considered very difficult to diagnose. In addition to the more visible 
indicators above, consider this CDC list of external signs that a person 
is concussed: “Appears dazed or stunned; Moves clumsily; Answers 
questions slowly; Shows mood, behavior, or personality changes.”237 In 
other words, things parents observe about their teenagers, with or 
without a concussion, as they silently puzzle through the daily parent 
question, “I wonder if there’s anything going on with my teenager?” 
One way to find out if there’s something going on with your teenager 
is to ask, of course. The CDC provides the list of self-reported symptoms 
a concussed child may offer: “Headache or ‘pressure’ in head; nausea or 
vomiting; balance problems or dizziness; double or blurry vision; 
bothered by light or noise; feeling sluggish, hazy, foggy, or groggy; 
confusion, or concentration or memory problems; just not ‘feeling 
right,’ or ‘feeling down’.”238 The Lystedt legislation asks the parent of a 
youth athlete, ordinarily an adolescent under Lystedt, to observe 
whether that adolescent is feeling right or feeling down, is sluggish or 
groggy, or bothered by light or noise, and is willing to share that 
information with a parent. If it weren’t serious, it would almost be 
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funny, because teenagers usually say that they’re fine, not just to cover 
what they’re feeling, but because they lack the maturity and insight to 
meaningfully assess whether they are “feeling right” as their brains and 
bodies undergo dramatic change. The symptoms of a concussion sound 
similar to some of the symptoms of being a teenager, at least to the 
extent a parent can observe and interpret those symptoms on behalf of 
her child. 
The Lystedt structure is the perfect storm of vagaries: it addresses a 
disorder that’s notoriously difficult to diagnose because the symptoms 
are subtle, and it relies on the self-reporting of these subtle symptoms 
by children, and then invites parents to investigate their child’s hedonic 
experience and properly attribute that experience to head injury rather 
than childhood, and finally implicitly invites parents to make a decision 
about a future of subtle neurological impairment for their child. It’s not 
that informing parents of concussion symptoms is harmful in this 
context, to the contrary, but it’s important to accurately estimate the 
combined efficacy of parent and coach information as the bedrock to a 
statutory public policy intervention. 
If Lystedt is in function an informed consent regime, it’s essential to 
remember that the consent is given by one party on behalf of another. 
The unique attributes of concussion may make that particularly 
problematic, both because concussion relies on self-reporting of 
symptoms, and because those symptoms are so difficult even for health 
care professionals to measure, particularly in the absence of baseline 
testing, which very few Lystedt statutes require. Parents lack the 
authority to waive liability in far more concrete circumstances where 
the risk and the waiver language are clearer, yet the decision to allow a 
child to participate in contact sports is now in effect a waiver of liability 
because Lystedt imparts immunity and because the information can 
serve as a building block in an assumption of risk defense. 
3. Parents Are Not at Their Best in the Sports Context 
Research shows that along with coaches and teammates, parents 
contribute to the pressure youth athletes feel not to report concussion 
symptoms.239 While athletic deaths due to concussion are rare, long-
term impairment to memory and focus is more common, and increased 
risk of prematurely experiencing serious disorders such as depression 
and suicidality, multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s 
disease, are at stake when parents minimize concussion symptoms. Yet 
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they do, which requires some consideration; after all, parental authority 
in general is premised in part on maturity and the ability to engage in 
long-term thinking that children lack.  
Given the challenge of assessing an athlete’s symptoms and her 
readiness over time to return to play based on improvements in those 
symptoms, parents need to bring their “A” game to this work. Yet 
parents in popular culture and confirmed by research are too often not 
at their best in the sports setting. Ego identification and substantial over-
estimation of their child’s athletic prospects color their risk calculations, 
both in exposing their children to primary concussion risk and in 
assessing the seriousness of their condition after a first hit. This is not 
to say that many parents aren’t sober or even overly concerned about 
concussion risk,240 but rather to acknowledge that research confirms 
that parents experience intense emotions surrounding their children’s 
sports, and those emotions have the potential to distort risk decision-
making. If over half of sports parents feel anger at some point during a 
child’s sporting event, it shouldn’t be offensive to consider whether the 
context of their decision-making requires more rigorous supervision. 
Recall that most parents find it excruciating to listen to their baby cry 
and to nonetheless refrain from picking her up, or at least turning the 
car seat around so that the infant can see the other human in the car.241 
In part for that reason, state legislatures impose a more sober 
perspective on a parent’s decision-making in the infant car seat 
context.242 These laws aren’t accusing a parent of bad faith, but are 
recognizing that the emotional state of parenting can sometimes 
interfere with child welfare in predictable contexts. If parents were not 
susceptible to feeling overwhelmed by temptation in the car seat 
context, it would be adequate to provide them with full risk information 
and allow them to implement the best safety protocol given their own 
value system for the child.243 A sports parent may experience the 
urgency of the child’s interest in playing, and paired with the parent’s 
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independent emotional stake in the athletic achievement of the child, 
find themselves minimizing long-term risk as against the impulses of 
the moment in much the way a parent who turns around a rear-facing 
car seat does.  
4. Parents Have No Control over the Rules of Play or the Conduct 
of Practices and No Avenue to Influence Them Under Lystedt 
To the extent primary prevention is an essential part of reducing overall 
harms of concussion to youth athletes, Lystedt is arming parents with 
information but not authority to address primary prevention. Arguably, 
Lystedt does worse than that. By encouraging parents to focus on second-
impact syndrome, Lystedt creates a defined zone of parental action, 
directing concerned parents to contemplate that space, and explicitly 
empowering them with instructions in the second-impact context. By 
omission, Lystedt minimizes parental agency before a first hit.  
In addition, even the highly concerned and informed parent who 
worries about primary prevention is presented with a binary choice set 
at the beginning of the season: play with the current risk scenario, or 
don’t play. This is the same decision parents face with respect to all 
recreational waivers, which courts do not tend to enforce. It’s the choice 
parents faced prior to child labor laws: put the child to work with 
limited education and safety, or don’t, and absorb the economic 
consequences. Parents may, however, want to have that third choice, 
the warrant of habitability: participate, but with smarter rules of play, 
and more conscientious practices. Lystedt cannot operate to achieve 
that third way. Other forces will get us there eventually, as public 
pressure increases on sports organizations at the international, national, 
state, and local levels, from professional to collegiate to youth leagues, 
but the Lystedt framework largely disarms parents as an effective force 
in that process. 
Game changes underway in youth leagues are to be celebrated. Yet 
there’s little reason to trust the leagues to act with a speed or seriousness 
that matches the state of the evidence or medical advice. Consider the 
established medical recommendations around the appropriate age to 
begin checking in ice hockey. That recommendation is age fifteen; 
leagues are reforming, but not the whole way up to that 
recommendation. Public health researchers characterize the problem 
clearly: 
[T]he American Academy of Pediatrics has recommended that 
body checking in ice hockey be limited to players over the age 
of 15. Despite this recommendation, most ice hockey 
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associations across North America allow body checking as early 
as 13 years old. This particular issue reinforces how the culture 
of sport in today’s society is engulfed in the idea of performance 
and professionalization, which ultimately has a negative impact 
on the physical health and well-being of young athletes.244 
While a series of unsuccessful lawsuits against leagues in pursuit of 
rule changes, including soccer245 and football,246 seem to have 
nonetheless energized rule changes, Lystedt separates the individual 
parent from these larger forces. If the detailed attention state law has 
given to return to play protocols were extended to evaluating rules of 
play, we could energize a real revolution in the safety of youth sports. 
By immunizing coaches and sports organizations from suit, Lystedt 
decreases the pressure these actors would receive from liability insurers 
to study and implement appropriate game changes. 
Not only does Lystedt render parents less effective as a pressure point 
on game rules, but arguably, it uses them to legitimize the status quo. 
Parents are not the cheapest cost avoiders, they are not experts in 
medicine or in the subtleties of game rules and risks, and they do not 
have the power to design around the safety risks even if they had the 
expertise. In the scheme of this moment of cultural contradictions, 
parents are serving as a fig leaf on the system of youth concussion risk, 
and the Lystedt Laws are consistent with that conception of the parent 
role. 
A serious public health approach to concussion risk would ask what 
reduces that risk overall at relatively low social cost, and then 
implement the plan uniformly. Whatever answer such an investigation 
yields, if that answer performs better than parents at protecting youth 
from traumatic brain injury, then it should prevail. The movement to 
adopt Lystedt across all fifty states has interfered with the process of 
arriving at those optimal prevention strategies by declaring one focal 
point of prevention, return to play, and immunizing all other potential 
intervention points. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Lystedt legislation is unusual. It is not an explicit informed 
consent statute, but it trades on the legal rituals of providing information 
and requiring parental sign-off to enhance the sense that risks are 
knowingly undertaken. Yet the risks that are undertaken are not fully 
explicated to parents or athletes in the Lystedt framework, because the 
primary risks of a first concussion are not described at all, and those are 
the risks most likely to occur. The Lystedt paperwork feels like waiver 
information, but it is not. It is formally second-impact syndrome 
prevention information, as it primarily instructs actors on protocols after 
a concussion has occurred. Parents do not waive their child’s right to sue 
for injury contractually, though they surely sense that they are engaged 
in that ritual. Often, unbeknownst to them, that potential liability for 
negligent harm to their child has already been removed by Lystedt laws 
with the grant of statutory immunity from suit. The information they are 
given, though, trains their attention toward post-concussion risks, and 
focuses their agency toward preventing a catastrophic but unlikely 
second-impact injury. There is almost a theatrical quality to this, with 
parents playing a compliant and prescribed role that puts them at a safe 
distance from the actual controversy surrounding appropriate levels of 
risk for children in youth sports. What role parental voice might have 
played in agitating for change in risk levels before the fifty states trained 
their focus on return to play protocols, we cannot know. But their value 
in legitimizing the status quo, utilizing the great weight of their parental 
decision-making authority, should not be underestimated. We must 
understand the real oddity of the Lystedt structure and its departure 
from the norms of parental decision-making to reveal its functioning. In 
their assigned role under the Lystedt laws, parents play an 
underappreciated but essential part in furtherance of Lystedt’s status quo 
protective operation, one that stretches rather than reflects the 
conception of parents in other areas of law. 
